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INOCULATION INVENTIONS: THE INTERPLAY OF
INFRINGEMENT AND IMMUNITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
BIODEFENSE VACCINES

CYNTHIA

M. Ho*

INTRODUCTION
In the months following September 2001, patents were featured
prominently in the news in connection with a national anthrax scare.' At the time,
the only drug that was approved to treat inhalation anthrax was Cipro, 2 a patented
drug produced by Bayer.3 Cipro was quickly hailed as the drug of choice.4
* Clifford E. Vickrey Research Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
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1. See Matt Fleischer-Black, The Cipro Dilemma: In the Anthrax Crisis, Tommy Thompson
DistortedPatent Law to Save Public Health. Good Move?, 24 AM. LAWYER 53 (2002); see, e.g.,
Matthew Herper, Cipro, Anthrax and the Perils of Patents, FORBES.COM (Oct. 17, 2001), at
http://www.forbes.com/2001/10/17/1017cipro.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Anthony York, Is It
Time to Bust the Cipro Patent?, SALON.COM (Oct. 18, 2001), at http://archive.salon.conm/tech/feature/
2001/10/18/cipropatent/print.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). See also Tamar Lewin, A Nation
Challenged. Fear of Infections; Anthrax Scare Prompts Run on an Antibiotic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2001, at B8 (noting that people were stockpiling anthrax out of fear); Eric Lipton & Jim Rutenberg A
Nation Challenged. The Incidents; Anthrax Reports Widen, But No Link is Found,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
2001, at Al (reporting new anthrax cases, including exposed NBC employees); Michael Stroh, 'No
Guarantees' That Mail Is Safe, PostmasterSays, BALT. SUN, Oct. 25, 2001, at IA (noting actions taken
by the United States Postal System in light of the anthrax scare including new machines and additional
screening facilities).
2. FDA, DHHS, FDA TALK PAPER, APPROVAL OF CIPRO FOR USE AFTER EXPOSURE TO
INHALATIONAL ANTHRAX (Aug. 31,2000), at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/ANS01030
.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). Although other antibiotics were available to treat general anthrax,
they were not specifically approved to treat inhalation anthrax.
E.g., Gina Kolata, A Nation
Challenged- Other Medications; Cipro Isn't the Only Drug That Can Be Prescribed,Anthrax Experts
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at B7 (noting that penicillin and tetracycline had been approved to treat
cutaneous anthrax and gastrointestinal anthrax and that they were expected to also be effective against
anthrax spores).
3. U.S. Patent No. 4,670,444 (issued June 2, 1987).
4. E.g., Jessica Reaves, Drug of the Moment: Cipro, TIME.COM (Oct. 18, 2001), at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,180092,00.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Sarah
Boseley, After September 11: Drug Dealing: Three People Have Died of Anthrax in the U.S.,
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 24, 2001, at 2 (reporting that Cipro "is the best chance of life for anyone
who has inhaled anthrax spores."); Lewin, supra note 1, at B8 (reporting huge demand for Cipro,
despite lack of definitive scientific evidence that it is clearly superior for treatment of anthrax). In
addition to Cipro's unique position in the market, news coverage may have also further solidified
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However, because patents traditionally allow their owners the right to exclude all
others from making and selling the patented invention,5 concern developed that
Bayer would not only be profiting from bioterrorism, 6 but also possibly
endangering public health if Bayer could not adequately supply enough Cipro. To
address fears of a potential shortage, Senator Charles Schumer of New York, as
well as public interest groups, advocated that Bayer's patent rights should be
secondary to ensuring adequate supplies; in particular, the Senator proposed to
force compulsory licensing of the patent on Cipro to enable generic companies to
enter the market. 7 Initially, former Secretary of Health and Human Services,
Tommy Thompson, asserted that such action was not possible under the patent
laws.8 However, after Canada decided to impose a compulsory license on Cipro,
Secretary Thompson began threatening to do the same. 9 Shortly thereafter, Bayer

Cipro's prominence in the public mind. For example, Tom Brokaw of the NBC Nightly News held a
bottle of Cipro before the camera and stated "In Cipro we trust." Herper, supra note 1.
5. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2001). Of course, there are some exceptions to the patent rights, as
described in greater detail later in this article. See discussion infra Part I11.
6. Although Bayer was already providing the drug at a discount to the government ($1.77 per pill,
compared to the wholesale price of $4.67 per pill), Bayer was nonetheless criticized for appearing to
profit from bioterrorism in comparison to generic companies that were clamoring for the opportunity to
sell the drug for a mere forty cents per pill. E.g., Gardiner Harris, Questions of Security: Bayer is
Accused of Profiteeringon Cipro, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2001, at A6; Reaves, supra note 4 (noting that
Bayer angrily denied accusations that it was profiting from the anthrax situation). Vanessa Fuhrmans &
Ron Winslow, The Treatment: Its Image Under Fire, Bayer AG Scrambles to Meet Cipro Demand,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2001, at AI (noting that although Bayer initially kept a low profile to avoid the
perception that it would be seen as exploiting an opportunity, it then launched a public relations
"counteroffensive" to repair its public image); Robert Kuttner, War Profiteering on Anthrax Meds,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 2001, at A 13 (noting that "America could be on the verge of a public health
catastrophe" and suggesting that Bayer's resistance of government licensing of the Cipro patent was
part of the problem). But see Editorial, The Cipro Circus, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2001, at A20
(suggesting that Bayer had been unfairly treated in the press in the context of the Cipro crisis and
concluding that drug patent rights are in fact essential to national security); Lea Paterson, US Patent
ReappraisalPoses Long-Term Dangers, TIMES (London), Oct. 29, 2001 (suggesting that any deviation
from Bayer's patent rights would be tantamount to penalizing "success" and moreover would be
addressing immediate problems at the risk of long-term "fundamentals").
7. See Letter from Ralph Nader & James Love, to Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health and
Human Servs. (DHHS) (Oct. 18, 2001), at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/nadethoml0182001
.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (noting that "we were shocked by your comments ... indicating that
you do not have the legal authority to authorize generic production of ciprofloxacin, a drug used to treat
victims of an anthrax attack. This, of course, is not true."); see also Donald G. McNeil, Jr., A Rush for
Cipro, and the Global Ripples, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at Al (noting Senator Schumer's proposal
that the government buy generic versions of Cipro for an emergency stockpile); Memorandum from Al
Engelberg, to Senator Schumer (Oct. 13, 2001), at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2001October/002113.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (providing extensive legal analysis regarding authority
for compulsory licenses of Cipro under 28 U.S.C. § 1498); York, supra note I (suggesting that it is
"ludicrous" for Thompson to suggest that he can not use his authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
8. Elisabeth Bumiller, Administration Won't Allow Generic Versions of Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
18, 2001, at B8.
9. E.g., Dan Ackman, A New Deal on Cipro, FORBES.COM (Oct. 24, 2001), at http://www.forbes
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negotiated substantially discounted prices with both Canada and the United States,
promising to increase production to satisfy the necessary demand, such that the
compulsory license issue became moot. '0
Although the patent on Cipro has now expired," the issues that surrounded
the Cipro patent continue to persist. In particular, although the United States
would not have supply issues in the event of another terrorist attack utilizing
anthrax, similar legal and political problems would likely be resurrected. Patent
applications have been on the rise since the anthrax scare, including applications
and issued patents on methods of treating biological warfare.' 2 Accordingly,
patent issues will likely need to be addressed in defending against future attacks.
While domestic authority continues to exist for the federal government to issue
compulsory licenses of patented drugs, 13 doing so may still be inconsistent with
international obligations, or at least may expose the United States to claims of
hypocrisy. Indeed, considering that the United States was accused of hypocrisy for
even considering use of a compulsory license in the context of Cipro, any actual
use of such licensing is likely to have negative implications. 14

.com/2001/10/24/1024topnewsprint.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005) (quoting Tommy Thompson as
saying to talk show host Larry King that "[Bayer is] going to either meet our price, which is less than
$1, or else we're going to go to Congress .... "); Shankar Vedantam & DeNeen L. Brown, U.S. Seeks
Price Cut from Cipro Maker; Bayer to Announce Pact 'Shortly,' WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2001, at A 16.
10. Keith Bradsher & Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Says Bayer Will Cut Cost of Its Anthrax Drug,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2001, at B7; Keith Bradsher, Bayer Agrees to Charge Government a Lower Price
for Anthrax Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at B8; Harris, supra note 6, at A6 (noting Bayer's
announcement of a "historic" agreement to sell Cipro for 95 cents a pill to the government).
11. Henry Dummett, Flood Gates Opened to Generic Cipro Market in US., WORLD MKTS.
ANALYSIS, June 11, 2004 (noting that Cipro patent expired on June 9, 2004, and FDA approval of more
than ten generic versions are pending).
12. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (concerning specific patent applications
regarding biodefense vaccines).
13. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
14. E.g., Emma Clark, America's Anthrax Patent Dilemma, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Oct. 23, 2001
(reporting that the United States would be accused of hypocrisy if it decided to use a compulsory
license); Jill Carroll & Ron Winslow, Bayer Agrees to Slash Pricefor Cipro Drug, WALL ST. J., Oct.
25, 2001, at A3. Editorial, Patent Abuse, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 22, 2001 (noting that
"[wiestern governments are guilty of double standards" in comparison to the eleven confirmed cases of
anthrax infection versus the 25 million people faced with dying of AIDS in Africa for lack of medical
treatment); Press Release, Oxfam America, Oxfam America Calls on U.S. to Make Anti-Anthrax
Medicine Available (Oct. 23, 2001), at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/press_
releases/archive200l/art245.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005); McNeil, supra note 7; Geoff Dyer &
Adrian Michaels, A Bitter Pillfor the Drug Makers, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Oct. 23, 2001, at 27
(noting a double standard between United States action concerning Cipro versus action against South
Africa and Brazil); Paul Blustein, Drug Patent Dispute Poses Trade Threat; Generics Fight Could
Derail WTO Accord, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at El (noting the global implications of the Cipro
patent fight, including WTO negotiations scheduled to take place at Doha); Boseley, supra note 4, at 2
(comparing the two anthrax deaths to the thousands of daily deaths in Africa from HIV in the context of
United States hypocrisy in enforcing patents in developing countries, such as Thailand and South
Africa).
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Against this backdrop of potential political controversy and continuing threats
of terrorism, there has been a surge of interest in vaccines to address bioterrorism.
Despite a clearly recognized need to address bioterrorism by developing new
vaccines, 15 the demand to ensure legally adequate bases for addressing patent
liability that may arise with respect to such vaccines seems largely absent from
both popular and academic perspectives since the anthrax/Cipro crisis.' 6 This
article aims to address this void by providing a timely examination of the scope of
patent rights under both domestic and international law.
In particular, this article addresses the complex intersection of innovation
and infringement relevant to the development of vaccines that could inoculate
against bioterrorist threats. Proponents of the patent system suggest that the
exclusivity of rights guaranteed by a patent provides an incentive for research and
development of commercial products.' 7 However, researchers suggest that strong
patent rights unduly interfere with scientific research. 18 In addition, consumer

15. JONATHAN BAN, ET AL., CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ARMS CONTROL INSTITUTE (CBACI),
MEETING THE BIODEFENSE CHALLENGE: A "ROAD MAP" FOR A NATIONAL VACCINE STRATEGY,
REPORT OF THE CBACI NATIONAL VACCINE STRATEGY WORKING GROUP 1 (2004) [hereinafter

BIODEFENSE ROAD MAP], http://www.cbaci.org/pubs/reports/vaccineroadmap.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,

2005); S. 666, 108th Cong. (2003) (providing incentives to foster research concerning vaccines to
prevent and treat illnesses associated with bioterrorism). See also Elizabeth White, PatentIncentive is
Focal Point of Debate at Senate Hearing on Future 'Bioshield I' Bill, PAT., TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J., Oct. 15, 2004 (noting legislation based on S. 666 for planned introduction in the 109th
Congress to help ensure a thriving biodefense industry).
16. But see Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro: A Reevaluation of
Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. BUS. L. J. 125 (2002)
(discussing current legal issues surrounding patent law and government action); BIODEFENSE ROAD
MAP, supra note 15, at 32 (noting that a "vaccine strategy must also address the role of patents, which
could potentially act as a barrier to the development of vaccines or their use in response to an
incident"); Grace K. Avedissian, Note, Global Implications of a Potential US. Policy Shift
Toward
Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of "Super-Terrorism," 18 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 237 (2002) (discussing patent issues that would arise if the present patent laws were amended to
include more compulsory licensing).
17. E.g., PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA (PHRMA), FACT
SHEET, at http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/17.06.2003.746.cfm (last visited Feb. 24,
2005) (noting the importance of patent incentives to pharmaceutical companies); BIOTECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRY ORG.,

PRIMER: GENOME

AND GENETIC RESEARCH,

PATENT

CENTURY MEDICINE, available at http://www.bio.org/ip/primer/printer.asp

PROTECTION

AND 21ST

(last visited Feb. 24, 2005)
(concluding that "without patents, companies would be reluctant to invest in research and drug
discovery programs" because of the expense and risks involved in bringing a drug to market). In
addition, the Supreme Court has stated that patents provide a social good. See, Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) (noting that patent laws provide "a carefully
crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in
technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years.");
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (stating that patent laws promote progress
"by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often
enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development").
18. Patent rights entitle their owners to exclude all others from making, using, selling, offering to
sell, or importing the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). Although there are some
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advocates have challenged the incentive rationale and argued that patents create a
social harm by condoning unduly high prices on necessary treatment. 19 There are
some statutory and common law doctrines that suggest a middle ground between
these two positions by providing exceptions or immunities from the standard
liability that ensues from unauthorized use of a patented invention. 20 However, the
validity of these exceptions under both domestic and international law may in
some cases be questionable. Accordingly, this article seeks to provide a more
detailed analysis of the interplay between these various issues in order to properly
understand the true patent barriers to the development of biodefense vaccines, as
well as ways to negotiate those obstacles.
Part I of this article provides an overview of both the domestic and
international laws that govern the proper scope of patents in the United States. Part
II then addresses the extent to which the present patent system poses barriers to the
development of biodefense vaccines, both by illustrating potential patent liability
at various stages of vaccine development, as well as the potential bars to
development that may be imposed if a patent on a new vaccine is sought. Part III
provides a detailed analysis of specific exceptions that may minimize traditional
patent infringement, including various types of immunity from suit, or more
limited exceptions to infringement. Part III is organized into two main subcategories: existing limitations to patent liability and possible limitations. The
existing limitations include a range of common law and statutory exceptions for
government as well as private actors. The section also analyzes whether the
exceptions could withstand either Constitutional scrutiny or an international
challenge under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS). The discussion of possible limits to patent liabilty includes
existing equitable remedies that individual judges may provide, as well as
paramount considerations for any future legislation that may be proposed.

exceptions, general experimental use is not recognized either in the Patent Act or by common law. See
infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (discussing limited doctrines of experimental use).
19. Editorial, The People vs. Patents: The Drugs Industry is Taking Us Where Nobody Sensible
Wants to Go, NEW SCIENTIST, July 13, 2002, at 3; Tim Hubbard & James Love, We are Patently Going
Mad: Lifesaving Drugs Must Be Developed Differently For All of Our Sakes, GUARDIAN (London),
March 4, 2004, at 6. Within the realm of intellectual property, patents are routinely characterized as the
strongest and most valuable type of protection. In fact, the strength of patent rights has sometimes been
characterized as analogous to a strict liability regime. E.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645, 654 n.5 (1999) (citing 5 D. CHISUM, PATENTS
16.02[2], p. 16-31 (rev. ed. 1998)) (noting that patent infringement does "not require any showing of
intent to infringe."); Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(stating that "infringement is, and should remain, a strict liability offense"); Blair v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) (stating that "it is, of course, elementary, that an
infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge of the patent.").
20. See infra Part III.
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1.BACKGROUND
A. Legal Landscape of Patents

The present legal landscape concerning patent protection involves an
examination of both national and international laws. In particular, although patents
are traditionally governed by national laws, to the extent that nations have entered
into international agreements that mandate minimum levels of national patent
21
protection, those agreements are also pertinent.
1. United States
Patents issued by the United States are governed by the Patent Act, which
was enacted by Congress pursuant to Constitutional authority. Notably, the United
States Constitution authorizes, but does not require, Congress to enact laws which
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by providing to inventors a
limited period of exclusivity.2 2
In other words, Congress may implement
restrictions on present patent law since Congress is not obligated to provide patent
rights in the first instance; stated more bluntly, there is no absolute Constitutional
right to a patent.2
This point will become particularly relevant to discussion of

21. At present, no international agreement mandates uniform substantive patent law. However,
there is one agreement presently being negotiated under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) that would purport to provide uniform levels of patent protection. GRAIN, ONE
GLOBAL PATENT SYSTEM? WIPO's SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW TREATY (Oct. 2003), at
http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=159 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); CARLOS M. CORREA, SOUTH
CENTRE, THE WIPO DRAFT SUBSTANTIVE PATENT LAW THEORY: A REVIEW OF SELECTED PROVISIONS
(March 2004), http://www.southcentre.org/publications/workingpapers/paperl7/wpl7.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2005); SISULE F. MUSUNGU & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE
(QUNO) & GENEVA QUAKER INT'L AFFAIRS PROGRAMME (QIAP), MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND
TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION (WIPO), TRIPS ISSUES
PAPERS 3, at 11-12 (2003). The negotiations are presently stalled.
INT'L CTR. FOR TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE DEV. (ICTSD), MOVING FORWARD THE 'DEVELOPMENT AGENDA' IN WIPO, 8 BRIDGES
WKLY. NEWS DIG. 33, (Oct. 6, 2004), at http://www.ictsd.org/biores/04-05-28/storyl.htm (last visited
Feb. 24, 2005); ICTSD, Disclosure Requirements Remain Divisive in WIPO Patent Reform, 4 BRIDGES
WKLY. NEWS DIG. 10 (May 28, 2004), at http://www.ictsd.org/biores/04-05-28/storyl.htm (last visited
Feb. 24, 2005). Moreover, even if the Substantive Patent Law Theory (SPLT) were enacted, because it
is not tied to the WTO's powerful enforcement mechanisms, it is questionable whether nations would
feel compelled to comply.
22. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. At the time the Constitution was drafted, the term "Science"
actually referred to literature, whereas "useful Arts" referred to things in the scientific realm. Karl B.
Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarificationof the Patent Clause of the United States Constitution, 18
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 51 (1949); Alan L. Durham, 'Useful Arts' in the Information Age, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 1419, 1426 (1999); David Silverstein, Patents, Science and Innovation: Historical Linkages
and Implicationsfor Global Technological Competitiveness, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 261,
291-92 (1990). However, the distinction between these two terms is not important for this article.
23. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
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some present United States laws that may not withstand international scrutiny if
challenged for lack of compliance with international obligations.
2. International(TRIPS and Beyond)
In addition to considering current patent laws and the Constitutional
parameters that would govern any changes, constraints based on international
agreements that the United States has signed are also important to examine. The
most important international agreement is the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 24 which is the first international
agreement to mandate minimum levels of patent protection 25 for all member states
26
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), including the United States.
Although TRIPS is not the only international agreement governing United
States patent laws, it is the only one that is tied to powerful dispute resolution
procedures under the WTO.27 The procedures are important for the United States
to bear in mind because failure to comply with TRIPS can result in a dispute
brought against the United States before the WTO, with the potential for trade
sanctions as a consequence.28 However, not every failure to comply with TRIPS

24. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Including Trade
in Counterfeit Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
25. See, e.g. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 279 (1997)
(contrasting the requirements under TRIPS to those under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)); J. H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 11 (1997); Carlos M. Correa, Patent Rights, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 189 (Carlos M.
Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusufeds., 1998); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2d ed. 2003).
26. As of Jan. 3, 2005, there are 148 Members to the WTO. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
(WTO), UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE ORGANIZATION: MEMBERS AND OBSERVERS (2004), at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
In
addition, since TRIPS was signed in 1996, the United States has entered into a series of bilateral and
regional agreements with other countries that in many cases impose higher standards than those
specified under TRIPS. See GRAIN, TRIPS-PLUS: WHERE ARE WE Now? AN INFORMAL REPORT
FROM GRAIN FOR THE THIRD SAARC PEOPLES FORUM
1, 3 (2003), available at
http://www.grain.org/rightsfiles/trips-plus-where-2003-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005); See DAVID
VIVAS-EUGUI, QUNO, QIAP, & ICTSD, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS
WORLD: THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA), TRIPS ISSUES PAPERS 1, at 3-4 (2003),
http://geneva.quno.info/pdf/FTAA%20(A4).pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). Because of the higher
standards, they are often referred to as "TRIPS-plus" agreements.
27. The WTO dispute resolution procedures are uniformly regarded as the most effective means of
enforcing international laws. See, e.g., Laurence L. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and
New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2004)
(commenting that TRIPS has "teeth"); Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 25, at 276-77 (noting that the
new dispute settlement system was a significant achievement of the Uruguay Round).
28. Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of Shields Over Swords,
13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 312 (2004); Sungjoon Cho, The Nature ofRemedies in International
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results in an official complaint processed through this proceeding, let alone
warrants trade sanctions. 29 In fact, according to one study by the United States
entirety. 30
Trade Representative (USTR), no nation has complied with TRIPS in its
However, noncompliance with TRIPS would nonetheless make the United States
vulnerable within the WTO forum. In particular, the actions of the United States
will be particularly scrutinized,3' given its history of aggressively pursuing
questionable cases of noncompliance

with TRIPS 32 as well as threatening

Trade Law, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 763, 764 (2004); see also WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO:
e/whatis-e/tif
e/displ e.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
29. The DSU requires parties to first attempt to resolve disputes before involving the WTO
adjudicatory process. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, VOL. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1228-30 (1994)
[hereinafter DSU] (requiring parties to first consult with each other before requesting that a panel be
SETTLING DISPUTES: A UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto

established); see also WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: SETTLING DISPUTES: THE PANEL PROCESS, at

www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/disp2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (providing a
graphical illustration of dispute settlement process, beginning with consultation of parties). There are a
number of cases where countries officially request consultations but fail to proceed to a panel decision,
let alone sanctions for noncompliance. See, e.g., GATT SECRETARIAT, UPDATE OF WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT CASES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS SINCE LAST UPDATE, WT/DS/OV/19 (Feb. 6, 2004),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen search.asp?searchmode=simple (last visited Feb. 25, 2005)
(to access documents on the WTO web site, click on simple search, and enter the document symbol).
Moreover, politics often play a role in whether countries assert a violation of TRIPS. E.g., Peter S.
Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity From Infringement of FederalIntellectual
Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1453 (2000) (commenting that a variety of issues
implicate a decision to pursue a perceived TRIPS inconsistency). For example, developed nations, such
as the United States, may elect to use unilateral trade sanctions, or TRIPS-plus agreements to reach
desired results, rather than risk a negative decision (and possible sanctions) within the WTO system.
E.g., Sara M. Ford, Note, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing
Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 968-69 (2000) (noting that developed nations are not
likely to risk a binding negative decision by bringing the disputes before the WTO). Developing
nations, on the other hand, may be reluctant to raise a TRIPS noncompliance issue for fear of damaging
foreign relations and potentially creating vulnerability to unilateral trade sanctions. Id. at 969.
30. Menell, supra note 29, at 1453.
31. One classic example is that the United States was mocked for its hypocrisy in suggesting
compulsory licensing of the patented Cipro compound in the wake of anthrax attacks because the
United States had suggested that more modest actions by other nations, such as Brazil and South Africa,
should not qualify for compulsory licensing under TRIPS. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
32. See Tim Reason, Euro Clash, CFO MAGAZINE, May 2004, at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/
3013415/c_3046612?f=magazine featured (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (noting that the United States has
initiated more complaints under the Dispute Settlement process than any other country). In particular,
the United States aggressively pursued both Brazil and South Africa on the grounds that their systems
of providing compulsory licenses of patented drugs violated TRIPS. E.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, The
Global Reach of HIV/AIDS: Science, Politics, Economics, and Research, 17 EMORY INT'L. L. REV. 1,
35-37 (2003) (discussing United States involvement with international generic drugs); James Thuo
Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating
Access to Affordable AIDS Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 727, 768 (2001) (discussing
United States opposition to South Africa's compulsory licensing law); Frederick M. Abbott, The
TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP.
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unilateral trade sanctions against countries who refuse to establish standards
beyond TRIPS.

33

3. Patent Standards Under Domestic and InternationalLaw
a. Patentability
The basic/default standards of patentability and patent rights under
domestic and international law are presently in accord and thus can be easily
discussed together.
i. PatentableSubject Matter
First, with respect to subject matter that is patentable, TRIPS states that
inventions in all fields of technology should be patentable if they satisfy the
technical criteria of patent protection - new, non-obvious, and useful - unless they
fall within two exceptions.34 In particular, TRIPS permits but does not require
member states to exclude from patentability inventions regarding methods of
treatment, as well as inventions that violate ordrepublic or morality. 35

J. 71, 75 (2001) (noting that the United States has alleged TRIPS violations for granting compulsory
pharmaceutical licenses, even where use was authorized under Article 31 for health emergencies); see
generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, 151-57 (2003) (discussing United States trade pressure on South Africa and
Thailand, as well as the successful efforts of non-governmental advocates in countering such pressure).
The United States only dropped its case against Brazil after substantial public backlash; the Brazil case
was a public relations nightmare since Brazil had extraordinary and unprecedented success in fighting
its AIDS epidemic and one important element was their compulsory licensing of patented drugs to treat
AIDS. Chakravarthi Raghavan, U.S. Beats a (tactical) Retreat over Brazil's Patent Law, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK, June 25, 2001, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/tactical.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2005); Stephen Buckley, U.S., Brazil Clash Over AIDS Drugs; 'Model' Treatment Program Seen at
Risk in Dispute on Patents and Pricing,WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2001, at Al; SELL, supra, at 158 (noting
that after Brazil's successful program of distributing HIV/AIDS medicines under compulsory license
was given "prominent and positive press," the United States withdrew its case against Brazil).
33. See, e.g., OXFAM, OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER 33: U.S. BULLYING ON DRUG PATENTS: ONE YEAR

AFTER DOHA 3 (Nov. 2002), availableat http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp021112 bullyingpatents
.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
34. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 27. In addition to the explicit exceptions to patentable subject
matter, some have argued that because TRIPS does not define what constitutes an "invention,"
countries have leeway in deciding to eliminate certain inventions from patent protection. See, e.g.,
Correa, supra note 25, at 198 (noting that although the United States and European Patent Convention
permit patenting of isolated gene sequences, "[t]here is nothing in the TRIPS Agreement that would
oblige members to follow this . . . approach" and that definitions of inventions in other countries that
exclude such matter from inventions are in fact consistent with TRIPS).
35. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 27(2)-(3) (providing that member countries may exclude certain
subject matter from patentability). Moreover, to the extent that the United States has signed agreements
since TRIPS that are more restrictive of exceptions to patentable subject matter, the TRIPS exceptions
may not be truly available. In addition, Article 27(3)(b) provides for additional exceptions from
patentability for plant varieties that are protected by alternative sui generis system. Id. at art. 27(3)(b).
However, this provision is not applicable to the discussion of human vaccines.
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The present United States system does not take advantage of either of the two
explicit TRIPS exceptions to patentable subject matter. Rather, the United States
Patent Act provides no explicit subject matter exceptions from patentability.36 The
United States Supreme Court has also broadly interpreted the scope of patent
protection and suggested that it covers "anything under the sun that is made by
man." 37 The United States Patent and Trade Office (PTO) and lower courts have
taken this broad language to support further expansion of the scope of patentable
subject matter to cover subjects such as isolated gene sequences. 38
Congress could, however, potentially exclude isolated gene sequences from
39
patentability. This would be well within the bounds of Congressional authority.
Moreover, such action would arguably be permissible under TRIPS if such
sequences were not considered "inventions," as some countries have already
suggested.4 ° Of course, the United States has been advocating that other countries
recognize all biological subject matter as patentable, including isolated gene
sequences.41 Reversing course might raise political or foreign relations issues,
which, while theoretically possible, might not present a politically viable option.
ii. Technical Requirements of Patentability
In addition to satisfying the eligible subject matter requirement, an invention,
as disclosed in a patent application, must satisfy additional technical requirements
of patentability. As stated above, under TRIPS, as well as United States patent
law, an invention must be useful, new, and non-obvious.42 The application must

36. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
37. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952),
reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952), reprintedin 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001)
(declining to narrow the reach of patent law and issuing utility patents for plants).
38. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing patentability of gene sequences under
present United States law).
39. Since Congress need not create patents in the first instance, Congress can certainly limit the
bounds of patent protection. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (concerning authority for
Congressional power); see also Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative
Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constrainton Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
1119 (2000).
40. See Correa, supra note 25, at 198.
41. GRAIN, "TRIPS-PLUS" THROUGH THE BACK DOOR (2001), http://www.grain.org/briefings
files/trips-plus-en.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (noting that some TRIPS-plus agreements specifically
mandate protection of biotechnological inventions).
42. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 27; 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2000). Although the text of TRIPS
uses different terminology, a footnote to the text indicates that the terms are synonymous to those used
under the United States Patent Act. See TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 27 n. 5.
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sufficiently disclose the invention such that someone who is similarly skilled in the
43
art could replicate it.

However, because TRIPS fails to define any of these terms, there is at least
the possibility that individual nations have the flexibility to change their definition
of what constitutes new or non-obvious. 4 Although a well-established history
concerning what constitutes new or non-obvious already exists in the United
States, the TRIPS flexibility is an important consideration to the extent that
Congress may want flexibility in "re-defining" some terms to better address
innovation or public access to innovation. For example, there is no global
consensus on whether patents on isolated gene sequences are either "inventions" or
sufficiently new under patent law.4 5 The United States has long considered them
new,46 but since the Constitution and TRIPS allow for a more restrictive scope of
patentability, Congress technically has power to declare a narrower scope by
legislative fiat. This might be particularly relevant in the vaccine context to the
extent that some bioterrorism vaccines could require the use of patented gene
sequences.47
b. Patent Rights
i. General/BasicScope of Protection
The basic patent rights required pursuant to TRIPS and the United States
Patent Act are presently essentially identical. Both allow the owner of a patent to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the
patented invention for the term of the patent. 48 The patent term, under both TRIPS
and the United States Patent Act, is twenty years from the filing of the patent

43. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
44. See generally Correa, supra note 25, at 200-01; J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes
ofAge: Conflict or Cooperation With the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 441, 457
(2000) (noting that there is still no clear definition of the terms "novelty" and "non-obvious").
45. Correa, supra note 25, at 198; CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE
WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 52-54 (2000);
Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States
and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and A Fair-Use Exemption, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1624-25 (2001).
46. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (upholding a
DNA sequence patent); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(allowing a patent for the DNA sequence for human erythropoietin). However, in response to public
protest, the United States Patent and Trade Office (PTO) has heightened the patentability requirements
such that sequences with utility only as a general research probe are no longer patentable. Utility
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
47. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
48. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 28; 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). In addition, although not a
requirement under TRIPS, the United States imposes liability for those who indirectly assist in
infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c).
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application.49 Since no patent rights exist while the application is pending, the
effective term of a patent is twenty years minus the time the PTO takes to examine
the application. 50 Although the examination period varies for different types of
inventions, the average time is slightly over two years, thus making the average
patent term around seventeen to eighteen years, although it may be considerably
shorter if the examination time is lengthy. 51
An unstated but nonetheless important understanding behind both TRIPS
and the United States Patent Act is that patents do not provide an affirmative right
to use the patented invention. Patents only provide a right to exclude others.52 To
be entitled to use the patented invention, the owner must determine if there are
additional laws that bar use, or which require additional affirmative activities
before use is permitted. For example, before a patented pharmaceutical can be
sold, it needs regulatory approval from the Food and Drug Administration,53 a
process separate from the process of obtaining patent rights. 4 In addition, the
patent owner may need to determine if permission from another patent owner is
required to avoid infringement.
TRIPS and the United States Patent Act part ways with respect to what
exceptions exist for typical patent rights. Because the United States must meet the
minimum standards of TRIPS, the TRIPS requirements will be first discussed as
providing a template for understanding United States exceptions, including
whether the present exceptions fail to comply with TRIPS.

49. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 33; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
50. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 33; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).

51. U.S. PTO, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 19 (2003),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2003/2003annualreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005)
(noting average pendency to patent issuance or abandonment in 2003 was 26.7 months).
52. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 28; 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
53. The FDA must approve all new drugs before they can be sold through interstate commerce. 21
U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000). Moreover, the definition of a "drug" is broad enough to include vaccines. See
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
54. The separate approval process can further shorten the effective term of patent protection if the
FDA approval time is longer than the time to examine and issue the patent, which it often is. See, e.g.,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO), How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 38 (1998), http://www.cbo.gov/

showdoc.cfm?index=655&sequence=5#N_6_

(last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (noting that the average

effective patent term is about eleven to twelve years). See also WTO, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REPORTS:
CANADA-PATENT PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS

7.73-7.74 (2000) [hereinafter

CANADA-GENERICS] (describing effective patent term as only about eight to twelve years, such that
those subject to regulatory review are deprived of a substantial part of the period that inures to other
patent owners); CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (CDER), SMALL BUSINESS
ASSISTANCE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION PROGRAM (2003),

at http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/smallbiz/patent-term.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (noting that
patent term restoration aims to somewhat compensate for regulatory delays that would otherwise reduce
the effective patent term for pharmaceuticals).
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ii. Exceptions under TRIPS
There are two explicit TRIPS provisions that articulate exceptions to the
standard patent rights. In particular, TRIPS permits a "limited exception" to patent
rights under Article 30, if certain ambiguously stated exceptions are met.55 In
addition, Article 31 of TRIPS permits use without the authority of the patent holder
in cases where Article 30 is not met and where the Member has complied with
more than ten procedural conditions.5 6 Although some have suggested that other
articles within TRIPS could also be used as exceptions, 57 there is only a consensus
concerning the use of Articles 30 and 31 and therefore discussion will be limited to
these provisions.
(a) Article 30
On its face, Article 30 seems to be an ambiguous exception, 59 but the
provision has been interpreted by the WTO Panel in the Canada-Generic

55. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 30.
56. Id. at art. 31.
57. In particular, some have suggested that Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, which are labeled as
"objectives" and "principles" might serve as free-standing exceptions to patent rights. See J.H.
Reichman, Beyond the HistoricalLines of Demarcation:Competition Law, Intellectual PropertyRights,
and InternationalTrade After the GATT's Uruguay Round, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75, 100 (1993). But
see GERVAIS, supra note 25, at 116, 121 (suggesting that Article 7 "is a 'should' provision that probably
may not be used to reduce the scope of 'shall' requirements of other provisions of TRIPS and that
Article 8 is more of a policy statement). However, to date, no DSU panel has endorsed such arguments.
Notably, the WTO Panel did not endorse this approach, although it was definitely advocated by third
parties. See CANADA-GENERICS, supra note 54, at 7.26 (stating that the limiting conditions under
Article 30 "testify strongly" that there should not be a "renegotiation" of the rights under TRIPS,
although Articles 7 and 8.1 could be "borne in mind" in interpreting provisions such as Article 30); see
also id at 5.23 (noting Israel's position that because Articles 7 and 8 are in the text of the agreement,
rather than in the Preamble, that should underscore their utility as "primary tools for interpretation,"
such that Article 30 should be interpreted in light of Article 8 to grant members discretion to limit
patent rights where social and economic welfare dictate); id. at 5.27 (noting Poland's position that the
Preamble as well as Articles 7 and 8 confirm that protection of public health is paramount under
TRIPS). Moreover, the Doha Declaration's statement that all provisions of TRIPS should be
interpreted in light of the Preamble, as well as the objectives and principles, further suggests that these
provide additional context in which to view other exceptions, but are not free-standing exceptions
themselves. See WTO, Fourth Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, at 5(a) (Nov. 14,2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
gen search.asp?searchmode=simple (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
58. In addition, although the Canada-Generic case raised an issue with respect to whether
exceptions must be applied in a nondiscriminatory manner pursuant to Article 27(1), this seems a very
low threshold to satisfy. The alleged discrimination is permissible if it is not a "sham, or of no actual or
potential importance." CANADA-GENERICS, supra note 54, at 7.104. Even though the provision at
issue in that case was clearly directed at only the pharmaceutical industry, the Panel nonetheless said
that the "primary purposes" for passing the legislation was not dispositive. Id. at 7.90. Accordingly,
nondiscrimination will not be discussed at length.
59. See, e.g., Correa, supra note 25, at 207 (noting that TRIPS Article 30 used very general
wording, especially in comparison to more specific proposals that were made and rejected during the
negotiation process).
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Medicines case to have fairly stringent parameters. 60
Although WTO Panel
decisions technically have no stare decisis effect 61 and are only binding on parties
to the dispute, they are often cited in subsequent Panel decisions, which WTO
members closely follow. 62 Accordingly, although a subsequent WTO Panel faced
with interpreting Article 30 could take an entirely different approach, given the fact
that this is unrealistic, the guidelines set forth in the existing decision will be
outlined here as parameters for interpreting Article 30.63
(i) Canada-GenericMedicines case
To better understand the context of the Panel's decision in Canada-Generic
Medicines, a brief background of the factual context may be helpful. There were
two provisions in Canada's patent laws that the European Union challenged as
violations of the Article 28 right to exclude, the Article 33 patent term, and the
nondiscrimination requirement of Article 27.64 One provision, commonly known
as the "regulatory review exception," enabled potential manufacturers of generic
drugs to submit documentation for regulatory approval by the necessary agency to
obtain marketing approval for the sale of drugs before the patent term expired.65
Canada did not contest the facial violation of Article 28 rights, but argued instead

60. CANADA-GENERICS, supra note 54, pt, B; TRIPS, supranote 24, at art. 31.
61. E.g.,

WTO,

DISPUTE

SETTLEMENT

REPORTS,

INDIA-PATENT
PROTECTION
FOR
7.30 (1998) [hereinafter

PHARMACEUTICAL AND AGRICULTURAL CHEMICAL PRODUCTS, WT/DS79/R

WTO-INDIA] (noting that "panels are not bound by previous decisions of panels or the Appellate Body
even if the subject-matter is the same."). But see Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and
International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 845, 877-85 (1999)
(discussing the "myth" of the absence of stare decisis from international trade law in the context of the
WTO); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part
Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. REV. 873, 876-78 (2001) (same).
62. See, e.g., WTO, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REPORT, JAPAN - TAXED ON ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES,
COMPLAINTS BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (WT/DS8), CANADA (WT/DSI0), AND THE UNITED

STATES (WT/DS 11) 106-08 (1996) (noting the importance of adopted Panel reports); WTO-INDIA,
supra note 61, at 7.30 (taking into account the conclusions of the Panel in a prior decision); David
Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L., 398, 403
(1998); Dana T. Blackmore, Eradicating the Long Standing Existence of a No-Precedent Rule in
International Trade Law - Looking Toward Stare Decisis in WTO Dispute Settlement, 29 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 487, 502-03 (2004). Cf CANADA-GENERICS, supra note 54 (noting that only parties
to the dispute may appeal a panel decision).
63. Even before the decision, some commentators had already suggested a three-part requirement
to the Article 30 exception. E.g., Correa, supra note 25, at 207. There is at least one commentator who
has suggested the decision was so off-base and incorrect that it should not be considered. Robert
Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel: A Dangerous Precedent In Dangerous Times, 3 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 493, 494-95 (2000). See also Heifer, supra note 27, at 77-78 (2004) (citing
Howse as an example of how WTO panels should consider soft law for interpreting TRIPS provisions
such as Article 8).
64. CANADA-GENERICS, supra note 54, at 3.1.
65. Id. at 7.2 (citing Canadian Patent Act § 55.2(1)).
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that this provision was a limited exception to patent rights under Article 30.66 The
second provision, known as the "stockpiling exception," enabled the same
companies who qualified for regulatory approval to have a right to make the
patented inventions during the last six months of the patent term.67 As with the
regulatory review exception, Canada did not contest violation of Article 28 patent
rights, but instead argued that this was another limited exception under Article
30.68 The Panel ultimately found that the regulatory review exception was a
69
limited exception under Article 30 but that the stockpiling exception was not.
However, it is important to also note the Panel's underlying interpretation of
Article 30 in order to determine what other situations would appropriately fall
under Article 30.
The Canada-Generic Medicines case interpreted Article 30 to have three
separate and distinct requirements which were cumulative in nature. 70
In
dissecting each requirement, the Panel noted that it was applying the customary
international law for interpreting international treaties, as mandated under WTO
rules. 7 1 First, it noted that Article 30 required that there be a "limited exception,"
as a requirement to be interpreted separately from the other parts of Article 30.
Second, the exception must not "unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation"

66. Id. at 17.12.
67. Id. at 11 7.7-7.10 (citing Canadian Patent Act § 55.2(2)). The rationale of this provision was
that it would accelerate the provision of cheaper drugs to the Canadian public after the patent expired;
Canada submitted that but for the stockpiling provision, consumers would be forced to wait another
three to four months after the patent expired before generic versions were made available and that the
patent owner would obtain an unfair defacto extension of patent term. Id. at 1 7.10.
68. Id. at 17.12
69. Id. at$ 8.1.
70. Id. at 7.20. The Panel noted that the three separate elements must be "presumed to mean
something different" from each other, or else there would be redundancy. Id. at 7.21.
71. Dispute settlement panels must comply with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law. DSU, supra note 29, at art. 3.2. Some have suggested that this is a vague standard.
E.g., Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 25, at 289 (calling the standard a "vague guidepost").
However, customary rules include at least the rules under the Vienna Convention, which requires that a
treaty be interpreted in "good faith" in accordance with the "ordinary meaning" of the treaty terms in
their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. However, unlike interpretation of United States statutes, negotiating
history is not typically part of the interpretation process. In particular, there are only two situations
where it is proper to use such history: (1) to confirm the meaning based on the good faith interpretation
of the treaty terms, or (2) to determine the meaning of the treaty terms if the standard interpretation
leads to a meaning that is ambiguous or manifestly absurd. Id. at art. 32. Accordingly, resort to
negotiating history is very limited. Moreover, even if permissible, there is very limited documentation
of negotiating history for TRIPS. See, e.g. GERVAIS, supra note 25, at viii (noting that many essential
parts of the deliberations were "informal," including a complete lack of written record of oral
arguments, such that only the chairman's draft reflects the history of the negotiations). One final tool
available under the Vienna Convention that is also dissimilar from United States practice is that
"subsequent practice" of parties may be taken into account to the extent that it establishes agreement of
the parties regarding interpretation of the negotiation. Vienna Convention, supra,at art. 31(3)(b).

2005]

INOCULATION INVENTIONS

of the patent. Third, the exception must not "unreasonably prejudice" the
"legitimate interests of the patent owner," taking into account the "legitimate
interests of third parties." Accordingly, each of the three part requirements of
Article 30 is discussed below.72
Limited Exception
The WTO Panel interpreted the first element of Article 30 as a "limited
exception" to be a free-standing requirement from the remainder of the elements
under Article 30. In interpreting this exception, the Panel relied on definitions
from the Oxford English Dictionary to support its interpretation that there must be
a very "narrow exception" that involves a "small diminution of the rights in
question. 73 In addition, whether something is "limited" is determined with respect
to the Article 28 rights that are curtailed, but without consideration to the economic
impact' 4 or the number of Article 28 rights impacted. 75 Based on these parameters,
the Panel found that the stockpiling exception was not appropriately limited
because of the lack of limits on the quantity of production.76 In contrast, the Panel
found the regulatory review exception was limited because it was confined to
conduct necessary for regulatory approval, with no commercial use made of
77
resulting products.

72. The Panel first analyzed the stockpiling exception and then the regulatory review exception,
interpreting the elements of Article 30 within each one. However, for purposes of this article, each
Article 30 requirement will draw from the Panel's comments/decision with respect to both of the
Canadian exceptions at issue.
73. CANADA-GENERICS, supra note 54, at 7.30.
74. Id.at 7.31 (noting that the other two conditions of Article 30 are more relevant to economic
impact); id.
at
7.48-49 (noting that although the Canadian regulatory review exception could have a
"considerable" economic impact, the issue of economic impact is only addressed in the other two
conditions of Article 30).
75. Id. at 7.32 (noting that the "panel does not agree, however, with the EC's position that the
curtailment of legal rights can be measured by simply counting the number of legal rights impaired.").
Similarly, the Panel rejected Canada's assertion that "limited" exception existed so long as the patent
owner maintained the exclusive right to sell. Id. at 7.33. According to the Panel, the panoply of
patent rights under TRIPS Article 28 were not hierarchical based on the fact that if the right to sell were
the only right of relevance, the other stated Article 28 rights would not be necessary. Id.
76. Id.at 7.33.
77. Id.at 7.45. An interesting and important note here is that the Panel explicitly discounted
Canada's arguments concerning the beliefs of some WTO members about the scope of Article 30, as
well as the enactment by some countries of similar provisions after TRIPS. Id. at 7.47. In particular,
the Panel noted that there was "no documented evidence of the claimed negotiating understanding"
because acts by some countries failed to constitute sufficient subsequent practice within the meaning of
the Vienna Convention. Id.
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No UnreasonableConflict with "NormalExploitation"
The next major requirement focused primarily on what constitutes "normal
exploitation" of a patent.7 8 The Panel once again looked to the dictionary
definition of "normal" and concluded that the normal practice for a patent owner
would include the "more or less brief' period of market exclusivity that typically
exists after the patent expires. 79 However, it noted that the longer period of
exclusivity that occurs due to the "unintended consequence" of patent and
regulatory laws pertaining to pharmaceutical approval would not be normal. 80
Because the Panel found the stockpiling exception to exceed normal exploitation, it
never opined on what would constitute an unreasonable conflict with such
exploitation. 81
UnreasonablePrejudice to "LegitimateInterests" of Patent Owner
The Panel initially referred to the common definition of "legitimate" in
evaluating the final prong of Article 3082 and the negotiating history83 before
finding that there was no "legitimate interest" for pharmaceutical patent owners to
maintain an effective patent term equivalent with those of patent owners who did
not need regulatory approval to make use of their inventions.84 Because the Panel
concluded that there were no legitimate interests asserted, it never reached an

78. This element was only interpreted with respect to the regulatory review exception since the
stockpiling exception failed to satisfy the initial requirement of being a "limited exception." See supra
note 69 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at
7.53-7.56.
80. Id. at 7.57.
81. Id. at 7.59.
82. Id. at 7.68 (citing two definitions from THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD DICTIONARY 1563 (4th
ed. 1993)). The Panel rejected the EC's attempt at equating legitimate interests with the full range of
legal interests under Article 28 as emasculating the final provision of Article 30. Id
83. The Panel noted that the exception was derived in part from the Berne Convention, which had
slightly different language. Although the Panel could not decide why the Berne language was not
utilized, it nonetheless used the Berne drafting committee report to allegedly confirm its interpretation
of unreasonable prejudice and legitimate interests. Id. at 7.71-7.72 (noting that the Berne drafting
report suggested that a large number of copies would not per se constitute unreasonable prejudice of
legitimate interests of the copyright owner if equitable remuneration were paid). But see Howse, supra
note 63, at 502 (suggesting that the Panel improperly resorted to the Berne preparatory text, because
Berne dealt with copyrights and not patents).
84. The Panel noted that "[o]n balance ... the interest claimed on behalf of patent owners whose
effective period of market exclusivity had been reduced by delays in marketing approval was neither so
compelling nor so widely recognized that it could be regarded as a 'legitimate interest' within the
meaning ofArticle 30. " CANADA-GENERICS, supranote 54, at 7.82 (emphasis added). Moreover, the
Panel noted that although some countries had regulatory review provisions at the time TRIPS was being
negotiated, the fact that these exceptions "were apparently not clear enough, or compelling enough, to
make their way explicitly into the recorded agenda of the TRIPS negotiations" suggested that they
should not be considered part of the legitimate interests. Id. Stated differently, the Panel noted that
adjudication should not be utilized to decide a "normative policy issue that is still obviously a matter of
unresolved political debate." Id.
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analysis of what would constitute unreasonable prejudice to such interests.85
Similarly, it did not explicitly address how third party interests should be balanced
against the patent owner's legitimate interests, other than to8 6opine that legitimate
interests must include something broader than legal interests.
(ii) Moving beyond Canada-Generics
The Canada-Generics case can be distinguished on the facts from any
bioterrorism situation since bioterrorism was not an issue in that case. Rather, it
involved whether two different Canadian patent provisions that allowed for faster
public access to lower-cost generic drugs were permissible exceptions under
Article 30. In addition, at several points in the Panel decision, the Panel explicitly
87
noted other factual contexts in which it was specifically not rendering judgment.
Even though the case did not specifically address bioterrorism vaccines, this does
not preclude application of the analytical framework, which is not tied to the
88
facts.
An issue Canada-Generics did not expressly address is the extent that Article
30 might cover compulsory licensing. There have been arguments that Article 30
could be interpreted to enable developing countries without manufacturing
capacity to import patented drugs from other countries as a way around a limitation
to compulsory licensing under Article 3 1.89 This has never been an issue directly
addressed by a WTO Panel. However, the decision of the general council of
TRIPS to move forward with amending Article 31, rather than utilize Article 30,

85. Id. at 7.83 (noting that since neither of the claims of legitimate interests asserted by the EC
were in fact "legitimate" under Article 30, there was no undue prejudice to such interests).
86. Id. at 7.71.
87. For example, although the Panel found that Canada's then-existing stockpiling suggestion
failed to be sufficiently limited, it suggested that a stockpiling exception could be crafted that would fall
7.33-7.35. In addition, in the context of interpreting the term "legitimate
within Article 30. Id. at
interests," it discussed "one of the most widely adopted Article 30-type exceptions in national patent
laws - the exception under which use of a patented product for scientific experimentation, during the
[patent] term ... is not an infringement." Id. at 7.69. The Panel technically utilized this issue to show
policy arguments regarding what were legitimate societal interests, but nonetheless stated that "the
Panel draws no conclusion about the correctness of any such national exceptions in terms of Article 30
of the TRIPS Agreement." Id. at 7.69.
88. In addition, although the parties to the decision had opposing views on how the elements of
Article 30 should be interpreted, they agreed on the "basic structure" of Article 30, suggesting that this
structure will not be disputed. Id. at 7.20.
89. See Letter from CPTech, Oxfam, MSF, and HAI, to WTO Delegates (Dec. 19, 2002), at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngosl2192002.html [hereinafter CPTech et al. Letter] (regarding
December 16, 2002 Chairman's Text for "solution" to Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health stating that Article 30 is a solution to compulsory licensing/importing problem) (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005); see also GERVAIS, supra note 25, at 242 (noting that after the initial Doha
Declaration some broad interpretations of Article 30 were proposed); Avedissian, supra note 16, at 26769 (noting that a liberal interpretation of Article 30 to authorize exports of medicine under a
compulsory license may be possible).
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perhaps suggests that a WTO Panel might be similarly disinclined to favor the use
of compulsory licensing under Article 30;90 in addition, many have suggested or
even assumed that Article 31 is the only relevant provision for addressing
compulsory licensing. 91 Moreover, even if there is no per se prohibition of using
Article 30, the narrow interpretations of the three requirements would likely make
this exception still generally inapplicable to domestic laws regarding compulsory
licensing, as will be addressed in more detail later in this article.
(b) Article 31
Article 31 applies to national legislation that permits unauthorized use by the
government, or use by third parties authorized by the government in situations that
do not fall under Article 30. However, Article 31 imposes a long list of procedural
requirements that must be satisfied before the exception applies. The requirements
have been reported to be intended as a detailed "checklist" for member states to
provide safeguards against abuse.92 A brief overview of the requirements most

90. An interpretation under Article 30 would have logistically been easier since no formal
amendment to TRIPS would be required. Indeed, that was touted by some as the advantage of dealing
with the Doha 6 exception under Article 30. See Permanent Mission of Brazil - Communication
dated June 21, 2002, Paragraph6 of the Ministerial Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, IP/C/W/355, at 4 (June 24, 2002), availableat http://docsonline.wto.org/gensearch.asp?
searchmode=simple (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (stating in conclusion that an "authoritative
interpretation of Article 30 is preferable to those based on Article 3 1, as the former would be
administratively less burdensome, involving less steps for implementation"); OXFAM INTERNATIONAL,
ROBBING THE POOR TO PAY THE RICH?

HOW THE UNITED STATES KEEPS MEDICINES FROM THE

WORLD'S POOREST, OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER 56 (Jan. 28, 2002), http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/
pp 0 3 1201_robbing medicinesUS.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (suggesting that the United States is
not living up to the letter and spirit of the Doha Declaration). Other proposals suggested an
amendment of Article 31, or a waiver of Article 31(f), as well as a moratorium on dispute settlement
regarding the provision. See, e.g., Permanent Mission of the United States - Second Communication
dated June 25, 2002, Paragraph6 of the Doha Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
IP/C/W/358, at 6 (July 9, 2002), availableat http://docsonline.wto.org/gensearch.asp?searchmode=
simple (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (suggesting that the most expeditious solution would be either a
moratorium on dispute settlement or a waiver of Article 31(f)); Permanent Mission of Kenya Communication dated June 18, 2002, Proposalon Paragraph6 of the Doha Declarationon the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/351,
at 2 (June 24, 2002), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp?searchmode=simple (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (noting that
Article 3 1(f) should be deleted or an authoritative interpretation adopted); see also GERVAIS, supra note
25, at 242 (citing Thomas A. Haag, TRIPS Since Doha: How Far will the WTO Go Toward Modifying
the Terms for Compulsory Licensing? 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 945, 955-66 (2002)).
91. See, e.g., Correa, supra note 25, at 208-10 (noting that Article 31 provides conditions for
granting of compulsory licenses, as well as summarizing the grounds and conditions required under this
provision); JEROME H. REICHMAN & CATHERINE HASENZAHL, UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, NON-VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF

PATENTED INVENTIONS § 2.3 (2002), http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/projectoutputs.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005) (noting that TRIPS provides for non-voluntary licenses under Article 31).
92. GERVAIS, supra note 25, at 165 (1st ed. 1998). Compulsory licensing under the Paris
Convention is incorporated into TRIPS, although whether this provides for a separate avenue of
compulsory licensing is unclear. REICHMAN & HASENZAHL, supra note 91, at § 2.3 (noting that
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applicable to present United States statutes that might be subject to Article 31 will
be provided here. 93
An important requirement of Article 31 is that there must first be an attempt
to negotiate for a license directly from the patent holder before imposing a
compulsory license. In particular, Article 31 states that compulsory "use may only
be permitted" where the proposed user has first "made efforts to obtain
authorization" for use from the patent owner on "reasonable commercial terms"
and where those efforts have "not been successful within a reasonable period of
time."94 However, this provision also provides for waiver of the voluntary
negotiations with the patent owner in case of "national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency." 95 The 2001 Doha Declaration on Public
Health clarified that individual countries have "the right to determine what
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency." 96
Moreover, it specifically noted that it is "understood that public health crises,
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics,97
can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.

whether the Paris Convention statement that failure to work a patent locally justifies compulsory
licensing is unclear in light of the nondiscrimination provision of TRIPS art. 27). Indeed, the United
States had challenged Brazil's local working requirement, but under political pressure the United States
withdrew its suit, such that a WTO Panel has never resolved the issue. See Permanent Mission of the
United States & Permanent Mission of Brazil - Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Measures
Affecting PatentProtection, WT/DS199/4, at 19 (July 19, 2001), availableat http://docsonline.wto.org/
gensearch.asp?searchmode=simple (last visited Feb. 25, 2005); see also Dyer & Michaels, supra note
14 (describing United States action against Brazil to contrast United States action concerning Cipro);
supranote 31 and accompanying text (discussing United States pursuit of both Brazil and South Africa,
as well as the United States's subsequent withdrawal of such action).
93. This section primarily addresses the portions of Article 31 that seem to play a role in
compulsory licensing of vaccines by the United States. The provisions that apply to compulsory
licensing as a remedy to address anti-competitive practices are not addressed. TRIPS, supra note 24, at
art. 31(k). Similarly, although potentially applicable, since there is presently no United States
legislation that suggests the use of compulsory licensing specifically to enable exploitation of a second
patent without infringement of an initial patent pursuant to the terms of TRIPS Article 31(1), the
additional three requirements that must be met in that situation will not be further detailed. TRIPS,
supranote 24, at art. 3 1(1).
94. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 3 1(b).
95. Id. Even in cases where waiver of negotiations with the patent owner is applicable, the patent
owner must be notified of the emergency use "as soon as reasonably practicable." Id.
96. Doha Declaration,supra note 57, at 5(c). Although the document is technically not part of
TRIPS and not enforceable via the WTO dispute settlement procedure, it does have some legal weight
at least as persuasive authority. See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the DohaDeclaration
on TRIPS and Public Health under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 291, 314 (2002) (discussing the Doha Declaration as a form of "soft law with substantial
hortatory authority"); REICHMAN & HASENZAHL, supra note 91, at § 2.4 (noting that although the legal
status is "uncertain," on a practical level, the Declaration could be an authority from which future
panels "draw guidance" when deciding cases).
97. Doha Declaration,supra note 57, at 5(c).
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Since 2001, however, the scope of public health crises that would justify waiver of
voluntary negotiations has continued to be controversial.9 8
There are a number of conditions that apply to all cases of compulsory use,
regardless of whether the grounds for issuing a compulsory license is based upon
refusal to negotiate or an emergency. 99 The conditions are highly specific and
depart from prior international agreements concerning compulsory licenses. For
example, conditions governing the grant of the license include that use shall be
"considered on its individual merits" 100 and that the scope and duration of the use
must be "limited" to the authorized purpose.' 0 ' In addition, there are mandatory
procedural safeguards in the form of judicial or other independent review of the
use authorization.l 0 2 Even if the use is authorized, it is still contingent on "adequate
remuneration" being paid to the right holder that takes into account the "economic
value of the authorization." 103 Moreover, as with the review of the use
authorization, remuneration decisions must be subject to judicial or other
independent review. 104
Furthermore, Article 31 requires that use be authorized "predominantly for
the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use." 105 In
other words, if the United States were to allow compulsory use of a patented
invention, the use should predominantly supply needs of the United States market,
rather than be used to export to other countries. Moreover, the United States
would not be permitted to import vaccines made under compulsory license in
Canada if Canada were doing so primarily for export rather than to address a
domestic crisis. Although there has been a decision to waive this requirement for
some developing countries that lack sufficient manufacturing capacities to

98. In particular, the United States has contended that the only possible emergencies are those
noted in the Doha Declaration, while developing countries have argued for a broader interpretation.
E.g., BROOK K. BAKER, HEALTH GAP, DOHA REDUX - U.S. ENTERS NEW PHASE OF BAD FAITH
BARGAINING (2003), at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/hgap07022003.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2005);
MARY
MORAN,
MEDICINS
SANS
FRONTIERES,
RENEGING
ON DOHA (2003),
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/msf052003.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005); CPTECH ET AL.,
DEADLOCK

OVER

SCOPE

OF DISEASES

THREATENS

http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngosl1272002.html

TO

KILL

SOLUTION,

Nov.

27,

2002,

at

(last visited Feb. 25, 2005); CHAKRAVARTHI

RAGHAVAN, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, TRIPS CONSULTATIONS ON IMPLEMENTING DOHA RECESSED

(Nov. 29, 2002), at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/5246a.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
99. In addition, other grounds include non-commercial use, dependent patents, and anticompetitive practices. TRIPS, supranote 24, at art. 31.
100. Id. at art. 3 1(a).
101. Id. at art. 31(c).
102. Id. at art.

3

1(g), (i).

103. Id. at art. 31 (h).

104. Id. at art. 310).
105. Id. at art. 31(f).
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domestically produce necessary products, 10 6 there is no question that the United
States has sufficient manufacturing capacity to create its own products. Moreover,
the United States and other industrialized countries such as Canada have pledged
107
not to take advantage of any developed waiver to this requirement.

II.

PATENT BARRIERS TO DEVELOPMENT OF BIOTERRORISM VACCINES

There are two different patent problems that impact the development of
bioterrorism vaccines. The most likely problem for development and use of any
such vaccine is that the process of developing or using a final product may infringe
upon one or more patents. 10 8 A second patent problem only arises for those who
pursue a patent on a new vaccine. In particular, there are provisions of the Patent
Act that could not only delay the issuance of a patent, but also delay public use and
commercialization of a viable vaccine. Although such delay could present a
serious hurdle to development, because a patent is not technically required for
developing a vaccine 1°9 whereas patent infringement is always a potential risk,
infringement problems will be addressed first.
A. Infringement
This section will highlight some key issues with respect to identifying
potential pitfalls with patent infringement.'" 0 While there are some exceptions to

106. The Doha Public Health Declaration specifically requested that the TRIPS general council find
a solution as expeditiously as possible. Doha Declaration,supra note 57, at 6. The general council
did in fact come up with a detailed solution that essentially waives this requirement in certain cases for
developing countries. WTO, GENERAL COUNCIL, IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003), at
(last visited Feb. 25, 2005)
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/implempara6_e.htm
[hereinafter PARAGRAPH 6 DECISION]. The solution was intended to be incorporated into TRIPS as a
formal amendment. Id. at 11 (noting that the decision "shall terminate ... on the date on which an
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect . . ."). However, due to
disagreements between WTO member states, the formal inclusion of this has been delayed. INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, WTO MEMBERS RE-OPEN FIGHT OVER SUBSTANCE OF TRIPS-HEALTH AGREEMENT, March
12, 2004, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/insideustrade03l22004.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
107. PARAGRAPH 6 DECISION, supra note 106, at

6.

108. This is not a problem unique to vaccines, or even bioterrorism vaccines.
obviously an important issue that needs further analysis.

However, it is

109. However, a patent does confer commercial advantages, such that many entities are nonetheless
likely to pursue one despite the likelihood of patent infringement.
110. A complete analysis of patent infringement is a complex endeavor. For example, many
companies regularly obtain legal opinions concerning potential infringement of patents before engaging
in commercial sale of a single product. These opinions typically focus on infringement of a single
patent with respect to a single product and still regularly span 50-100 pages in length. Obviously for
the purposes of this article, a complete infringement analysis of every existing or potential biodefense
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patent infringement that may apply and are discussed later, this section aims to first
clarify the specific activity that gives rise to infringement. In particular, this
section will briefly describe what activities from a vaccine's original conception to
its final commercial use might result in patent infringement."'
Patent infringement may be predicated on any one of five different
enumerated acts - making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented
invention - and many of these acts are pertinent to the development of bioterrorism
vaccines. 1 2 Each listed act would be a separate type of patent infringement;
accordingly, even if someone is making the patented invention though not selling
it, patent liability would still exist." 3 Moreover, there may be multiple patented
14
inventions within the same patent that can each be enforced against others.'
One major caveat to possible infringement is that if the entity that is
developing a vaccine actually owns all patents relevant to making that vaccine,
there would be no infringement issue because the use would be authorized by the
patent owner. However, it is often rare to own all relevant patents because many
inventions are cumulative. Accordingly, even though the federal government or its
various branches already own many biodefense patents, to the extent that use of
any of those patented inventions requires the use of even a single patent owned by
another, patent infringement is still an issue.15
Vaccines that use modem techniques of recombinant DNA are particularly
vulnerable to infringing pre-existing patents. In particular, for a vaccine developed

vaccine is not possible. However, this section aims to highlight issues that should be further explored
with patent counsel to best negotiate potential patent barriers.
11l. Patent infringement may also arise from importing a patented invention, but since the focus of
this symposium has been on development, and primarily development within the United States, this
section will not discuss importations. However, if another country were making and selling biodefense
vaccines that would be of utility to the United States, importing those vaccines would be an
infringement if the vaccine were patented in the United States. If the vaccine was only patented in
another country, that would not result in infringement within the United States since patent rights are
only enforceable within the territory of the granting nation. See 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (stating the scope of
patent rights); see also Gretchen Ann Bender, Clash of the Titans: The Territorialityof Patent Law vs.
The European Union, 40 IDEA 49, 50 (2000), http://www.idea.piercelaw.edu/articles/40/40_1/2.Bender
.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
112. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
113. Id. Moreover, although every patent must contain at least one claim defining the parameters of
the patented invention, most patents have multiple claims and infringement of any single claim
constitutes infringement of the patent. See id
114. By law, each patent must have at least one claim that defines the patentable invention. 35
U.S.C. § 112. In addition, the claims are what define the legal parameters of what may be enforced
against others. See id. However, to the extent that a patent has multiple claims, each can be
individually asserted against others. Cf 35 U.S.C. § 282 (noting that each claim of a patent is presumed
valid independently of the soundness of other claims). Accordingly, infringement may be predicated on
infringement of a single patent claim.
115. Although a complete review of existing patents and patent applications pertinent to the
development of biodefense vaccines is beyond the scope of this article, this section highlights some
important patent liabilities that may arise.
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based on a particular gene or marker, and that underlying gene - in an isolated or
purified form - is patented, use of the gene for development of testing will
constitute infringement. A developer may infringe upon a pre-existing patent for
developing a new smallpox vaccine using recombinant DNA - even if the
developer owns the corresponding vaccine patent - if someone else owns a patent
on isolated sequences of smallpox. To the extent that DNA-based vaccines are
17
being developed for conditions associated with bioterrorism, 116 such as anthrax'
and smallpox,' 18 this is a major issue. In addition, vaccines to treat SARS could
also face the same problem since applications have already been filed on gene
sequences for the SARS viruses; 19 although SARS has not yet been used as a

116. Current research and development activities concerning biodefense vaccines have focused on
smallpox, anthrax, botulism, cholera, plague, and Q fever. See, e.g., Philip K. Russell, Vaccines in
Civilian Defense Against Bioterrorism, 5 EMERGING INFECT. DISEASES 531, 531-33 (1999) (discussing
smallpox and anthrax in detail as posing the greatest risk for large numbers of casualties),
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/pdf/russell.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005); see also NOVA
ONLINE, BIOTERROR, AGENTS OF BIOTERROR (2001) (listing agents of bioterrorism), at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/novalbioterror/agents.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005)
117. There are pending patent applications for DNA vaccines to combat anthrax. E.g., Press
Release, University of Wisconsin - Madison, Researchers Announce Anthrax Research Breakthrough
(Oct. 23, 2001), at http://www.news.wisc.edu/releases/6693.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (noting
that the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF) and Harvard Medical School have jointly
filed for a patent on the anthrax toxin receptor); U.S. Patent Application No. 60/171459 (filed Dec. 22,
1999) (providing genes for constructing a "DNA-based vaccine which can be used to immunize ...
against the pathogenic effects of B anthracis infection").
118. Although the currently available smallpox virus, sold as Dryvax, is made from live vaccine,
there is a new smallpox DNA vaccine under development. Associated Press, Army Scientists Eye New
Smallpox Vaccine, ABC 7 NEWS, Apr. 27, 2004, http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/0404/142778.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2005). In addition, the Army is the assignee for one DNA vaccine against
smallpox. U.S. Patent No. 6,562,376 (issued May 13, 2003). However, there is at least one other patent
owned by a private corporation, Virogenetics, that could pose an infringement problem if one or more
of its sequences were used to create a smallpox vaccine. U.S. Patent No. 6,537,594 (issued Mar. 25,
2003).
119. E.g., WTO, PATENT APPLICATIONS FOR SARS VIRUS AND GENES (May 29, 2003) (noting that
teams of scientists have filed patent applications on all or part of the SARS virus genome and on the
virus itself that are reported to be sufficiently broad to cover most diagnostic tests, drugs, or vaccines
that would be developed to deal with an outbreak), www.who.int/ethics/topics/sarspatents/en/ (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005); see also U.S. Patent No. 6,194,212 (issued Feb. 27, 2001). Some applications
have been expressly filed for the purpose of maintaining freedom to operate for researchers. Peg
Brickley, Preemptive SARS Patents: U.S. and CanadianAgencies Say Patents will Preserve Openness,
THE SCIENTIST, May 9, 2003, http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20030509/02 (last visited Feb. 25,
2005). However, even if there is only one patent that is owned and enforced, that could be enough to
jeopardize the development of a vaccine against SARS. The World Health Organization seems
cognizant of potential patent problems. See WHO, UPDATE 91 - SARS RESEARCH: THE EFFECT OF
PATENTS AND PATENT APPLICATIONS (June 30, 2003), at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2003 06_30/en/
(last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
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weapon of terror, its high levels of infection and mortality make it a candidate for
120
biological terrorism.
A patent may be infringed by making the patented invention without regard
to what stage of development the invention is made. For example, infringement
may exist if the patented invention is made during initial laboratory screening of
possible compounds. Similarly, there is no per se immunity from infringement
when a vaccine is in human clinical trials since FDA procedures are separate from
patent liability. Accordingly, if a vaccine in clinical trials uses a patented
invention and there is no prior authorization for that use, infringement exists unless there is an exception that applies. Indeed, it is entirely possible that use of a
patented invention during laboratory testing might escape notice of the patent
holder but would be more easily detected once clinical testing began and news
reports of such testing were public. 12 1 The same is also true after a vaccine
completes testing and enters general commercial sales. At this point, publicity
concerning the vaccine is likely even more widespread and infringement is
probably more of a problem because the patented invention is likely to be not only
made - which already constitutes infringement, but the patented invention is likely
to be sold, or at least offered for sale - each of which constitute additional, separate
22
acts of infringement.1
B. Bars to Patentability- Secrecy Provision
Although infringement is the most typical patent barrier to developing
bioterrorism vaccines, there is another possible, albeit more obscure barrier, if a
patent is sought in conjunction with vaccine development. 23 In particular, there

120. SARS has been officially added to a list of Priority Pathogens by the National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) as a "class C pathogen." NIAID, NIAID BIODEFENSE
RESEARCH: NIAID CATEGORY A, B & C PRIORITY PATHOGENS, at http://www2.niaid.nih.gov/
Biodefense/bandcpriority.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). This categorization is the third highest
priority for pathogens and includes "emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass
dissemination in the future" because of their availability, ease of production, and dissemination, as well
as the potential for "high morbidity and mortality." Ali S. Chan, et al., CDC, Biological and Chemical
Terrorism: Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response, Recommendations of the CDC Strategic
Planning Workgroup, 49 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY (MMWR) 1 (Apr. 21, 2000), available

at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr4904al .htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
121. Moreover, even if testing was not initially noticed by the patent holder, infringing activity may
be subject to an infringement lawsuit up to six years after the activity. See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2000).
Accordingly, the failure of the patent holder to immediately discover the infringing use does not prevent
an ultimate infringement suit. Moreover, multiple uses of a patented invention may lead to increased
damages because damages must be adequate to compensate for the infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
122. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a).
123. It is difficult to assess how often secrecy orders are imposed, let alone determine the specific
inventions that are subject to secrecy. Therefore, it is hard to tell whether any such orders have been
imposed on inventions related to bioterrorism vaccines. However, even if they have not yet been
imposed, at least one commentator has suggested that they could be used. James W. Parrett, Note, A
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are provisions of the Patent Act that permit the federal government under certain
circumstances to declare the invention that is subject to the patent
application to be
124
held secret for at least a year on grounds of national security.
Although the imposition of a secrecy order may be appealed, 125 if it is not
overturned, an inventor essentially must cease development of the vaccine until the
secrecy order is lifted and the patent permitted to issue because the breadth of the
secrecy order goes beyond just the issuance of the patent; in other words, it
prohibits any use or disclosure of the invention.126 The wide breadth of the secrecy
order is further enforced by strict penalties for failure to comply, which include not
only forfeiture of patent rights, 127 but also financial penalties as well as possible
imprisonment. 128 The applicant is only entitled to limited compensation, 129 and

Proactive Solution to the Inherent Dangers of Biotechnology: Using the Invention Secrecy Act to
Restrict Disclosure of Threatening Biotechnology Patents, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
145 (2001) (advocating the use of secrecy provisions to address potentially dangerous biological
inventions). However, this suggestion acknowledged that there would need to be some modifications to
the existing law before the secrecy provisions could be aggressively used to police biotechnology. In
particular, the present statute only explicitly authorizes patent applications to be reviewed by the
Atomic Energy Commission, or the Secretary of Defense, or "the chief officer of another department or
agency of the Government so designated" as a defense agency by the President of the United States. 35
U.S.C. § 181. Parrett suggests that the President could easily designate agencies that monitor and
regulate biotechnology research as defense agencies under this provision, but provides little explanation
for why they should be classified as such, other than a passing comment that the CDC already addresses
epidemic disease outbreaks, so that regardless of whether the source is from terrorism should not
matter. Parrett, supra, at 173.
124. 35 U.S.C. § 181. The statute explicitly allows for the order to be renewed annually. Id
Moreover, the term of the secrecy order that is imposed "during a time when the United States is at
war" would be in effect for the entire "duration of hostilities and one year following the cessation of
hostilities." Id. The statute does not define when the United States is "at war," but to the extent that the
United States could be presently characterized as waging a war against terrorism of indefinite duration,
a secrecy order could also be of indefinite duration.
125. The appeal would be to the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to the statute. Id. However, there
is no judicial review provided concerning review of a secrecy order. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON
PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY & INFRINGEMENT §1.06(2)(a)
(2004); see generally 35 U.S.C. § 181 (providing no explicit language for judicial review of secrecy
orders).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 181.
127. Id. § 182 (declaring that inventions subject to a section 181 secrecy order will be "held
abandoned" if it is established that the order was violated by publication or disclosure of the invention
or filing of a patent application in a foreign country without permission of the PTO).
128. If an inventor is found to "willfully publish or disclose" the invention, or even "material
information" regarding the invention, he may be subject to a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for
not more than two years, or both. Id. § 186.
129. Id. § 183 (permitting an applicant whose patent is withheld to sue for compensation). The
compensation is for either damage caused by imposition of the secrecy order or the use of the invention
by the government, or both. Id.
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even then, the case law suggests that the actual opportunity for compensation is
30
more limited than the statute may suggest.'
The existence of secrecy provisions can negatively impact overall
development of biodefense vaccines not only for individual inventors who are
subject to secrecy provisions,' 3' but also for all inventors who are aware that the
government may bar public use and disclosure of their inventions. In particular, if
obtaining a patent is shrouded with legal uncertainty, that uncertainty may
undermine the ability of patents to provide
an incentive to research, in direct
132
contradiction to fundamental patent policy.
Despite the potential breadth of application of secrecy provisions, their
impact on biodefense vaccines is not necessarily as broad if such provisions are
invalid or impermissible under either domestic or international regulations. In
particular, the secrecy provisions could potentially be challenged as
unconstitutional.
Moreover, there is a stronger possibility that the secrecy
provisions may fail to comport with the United States's obligations under TRIPS.

130. A number of cases specifically deny compensation because the government had not actually
used the invention, such that there were no damages that required compensation. E.g., Constant v.
United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 600, 608-09 (1982); Weiss v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 2d 113, 128-29 (D.
Mass. 2001) (denying compensation for failure to show actual damages); Clift v. United States, 808 F.
Supp. 101, 110-11 (D. Conn. 1991) (denying compensation on grounds that government had never used
the invention and no damages were shown from secrecy order alone). However, evaluating actual
compensation awarded is difficult to determine since applicants subject to a secrecy order do not
necessarily obtain compensation through judicial means; in particular, the applicant can also apply to
the agency that issued the order and obtain a settlement agreement. See 35 U.S.C. § 183.
131. Although the statute states that the term of secrecy imposed is for one year, it also explicitly
allows for this period to be renewed, and the few published cases that exist suggest that the secrecy time
period can be quite substantial. See, e.g. Halpem v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 37 (2d Cir. 1958)
(pending secrecy order more than 10 years after initial order); AT&T v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 157,
158-59 (1983) (twenty-six year secrecy order); Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 317 F.2d 875, 877
(2d Cir. 1962) (nearly six years); Homback v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 524, 525 (1998) (twelve year
secrecy order); Weiss v. United States, 37 Fed. Appx. 518, 520 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (almost six years).
Moreover, even once the patent is issued, the delay could result in a reduced patent term in which to
exploit the patented invention (once the patent issues) since patent terms are calculated from the date of
the filing of the initial patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (providing that general duration of
patent shall be "for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from
the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United States"). Although the present
Patent Act allows for extension of patent term for some delays due to the Patent Office, this is capped at
five years, such that if the secrecy order exceeded five years, the effective time for exploitation would
be reduced. See id. § 154(b)(1).
132. Moreover, it might lead to inventions only being developed through trade secrecy. Although
that provides some protection, it is much more limited than patent protection and hence the number of
companies interested in investing in research for limited protection would likely be low. In addition,
promoting trade secrets, rather than patent protection, may be less beneficial to society because the
information is not shared.
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1. Constitutionality

Although no one contests Congress's authority to enact the secrecy
provisions, 33 whether they may nonetheless be unconstitutional has occasionally
been raised as an issue. The most commonly asserted argument against the secrecy
34
provisions is that they may constitute an impermissible restraint on free speech.
In addition, at least one commentator has suggested that the secrecy provisions
may be inconsistent with the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.' 35 The takings argument is weaker than a due process argument

133. Sources of Congressional authority to authorize the Invention Secrecy Act may reside in the
right to provide for the common defense, as well as eminent domain power. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl.
I (The Patent Clause); see also Sabing H. Lee, Protecting the Private Inventor Under the Peacetime

Provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 345, 378 (1997) (specifically noting
three possible grounds for Congressional authority to pass the secrecy provision, including the Patent
Clause, Defense Clause, and eminent domain).
134. E.g., Lee, supra note 133, at 381 (asserting that the Founding Fathers understood the
importance of academic freedom and therefore intended scientific freedom to be included under the
protections of the First Amendment). In addition, some well-respected intellectual property scholars
have noted in passing that the Invention Secrecy Act may be one of the few circumstances in which
patent law restricts speech, but that it may be a permissible restraint on speech based on grounds of
national security. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 235-36 (1998). There are actually two separate First
Amendment issues here - first, whether the secrecy order per se constitutes a violation of the right to
speech, and second, whether punishment for violation of the secrecy order constitutes an
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. For the first issue, there is no clear authority on whether
scientific expression constitutes "speech" that would be entitled to the full protection of the First
Amendment. See Lee, supra note 133, at 381 (noting that expression of scientific information has never
received explicit First Amendment protection). Rather, the limited discussion of this issue seems to
focus more on whether scientific expression is analogous to the types of speech that are typically given
less protection, such as advocacy of illegal conduct. Moreover, even if the scientific expression would
not rise to the level of speech fully protected under the First Amendment, the prohibition of public
disclosure could nonetheless be an impermissible prior restraint. Again, there is virtually no authority
directly on point. However, there is a single district court case that suggests restraint of scientific
information was appropriate where the magazine article in question described the hydrogen bomb and
could have been used to create an atomic bomb. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990,
999-1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979). So, the issue for biodefense vaccines is whether disclosure of patents
would be likely to wreak similar havoc as a patent application on an atomic bomb. Arguably, vaccines
to combat terrorism do not have the same deadly potential to destroy as a bomb. On the other hand,
disclosure of potential vaccines could be used by terrorists to help determine biological vulnerability.
However, with biodefense vaccines, the link to potential havoc seems at least one step removed from
the H-bomb situation.
135. Lee, supra note 133, at 399-409. For there to be a takings issue in the first instance, there is a
threshold question of whether inventors have an adequate property interest that the Takings Clause
would protect. Id. at 404-05. In addition, even if a patentable invention were a qualifying type of
property interest, there is a second question of whether a secrecy order constitutes an actual taking of
the property interest. Id. at 405-07. Third, even if the secrecy order does rise to this level, there is a
question concerning whether the taking is for public use and whetherjust compensation is provided. Id.
at 407-09. On the last two issues, a secrecy order issued on grounds of national security would seem to
be for public use in light of a broad reading of the public use requirement, and there is an explicit
statutory provision that provides for compensation under 35 U.S.C. § 183. There is limited judicial
authority that supports the proposition that a secrecy order in some instances could constitute a taking.
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since the secrecy order is typically imposed before a patent has issued;136moreover,
as previously noted, there is no absolute Constitutional right to a patent.
2. TRIPS
In addition, there may also be an issue with respect to whether the secrecy
provisions are vulnerable to a challenge concerning TRIPS compliance. In
particular, they may be inconsistent with the Article 33 patent term requirement,
the Article 62 requirement of reasonable procedures for patent grants, or possibly
both provisions. Compared to some other exceptions discussed in this article, the
TRIPS problem here may be more ambiguous because it could be argued that there
are no existing patent rights at the time the secrecy order is imposed.13 7 Moreover,
unlike other exceptions, there may be a TRIPS-based exception here; in particular,
there may be a defense under the Article 73 exception for national security.
The first issue is whether a secrecy order would result in a violation of the
required patent term under TRIPS Article 33. At first glance, there does not seem
to be a facial violation because Article 33 only states that the term of protection
available "shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted
from the filing date. '' 138 In other words, Article 33 does not guarantee an absolute

E.g., Constant v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 629, 632-33 (1989) (finding no taking for mere issuance of
secrecy order, but implying that ifactual government use could be established, a takings rationale would
be applicable). On the other hand, most cases dealing with secrecy orders address compensation
explicitly under the statutory provision of § 183, rather than the Fifth Amendment. Lee, supra note
133, at 405-07. Again, this seems to be a case where there is unclear characterization of government
action and compensation procedures, but there is no dissent with respect to whether the action is proper
under some rationale.
136. However, there could be an argument that the Takings Clause would apply regardless of
whether a patent exists if an invention itself is considered to be private property. Although there is clear
authority that patents are private property, Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876)
(holding that a "patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land [and] [t]he right rests on
the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions"), it is unclear whether
inventions that are not yet patents, or inventions that may not even satisfy the patentability standard,
would also be considered private property. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that inventions could
be property subject to the Takings Clause, there still may be no actionable takings claim for the same
reasons that exist with patented inventions. In particular, if a secrecy order is imposed for public use
and the compensation is deemed adequate, the issue would seem to be moot.
137. In addition, if the invention is under secrecy, there is technically no patent issued, such that
perhaps the typical patent right to exclude all others from the invention under Article 28 is not yet
applicable. Moreover, even if this right was applicable, if the government is only keeping the invention
secret, and not actually using the invention, there would still be no activity that falls under Article 28.
See TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 28. In addition, if such activity existed, it could arguably fall under
the exceptions of Articles 30 and 31.
138. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 33. Similarly, the lack of immediate issuance of the patent does
not seem to necessarily violate the Article 27 requirement that "patents shall be available" without
discrimination as to the subject matter of the invention. Id.at art. 27. Pursuant to the most recent
interpretation of the nondiscrimination requirement in the Canada-Generics case, the statute providing
for secrecy orders would seem to pass the threshold that there be no "sham," particularly since the
statute does not specify any specific type of invention, just like the Canada-Generics case. CANADA-

20051

INOCULATION INVENTIONS

period of patent protection; the fact that the negotiators specifically considered and
ultimately rejected a provision to extend protection for certain products that are
delayed by regulatory approval processes, such as pharmaceuticals, further
39
confirms that this provision does not guarantee an absolute period of exclusivity.1
However, there is also an issue with respect to whether secrecy orders violate
the patent term prescribed under Article 33 when read in conjunction with Article
62, which requires reasonable procedures for granting patents. In the sole case
involving interpretation of these two articles, Canada-Term of Patent Protection,
the Appellate Body 140 considered whether Canada's patent term of seventeen years
from the date of patent issuance complied with the TRIPS rule that a patent term be
twenty years from date of filing. 14 1 In that context, the Appellate Body found
Canada's law was inconsistent with Article 33 because there were some cases
where the TRIPS term was "available, as a matter of legal right . . . and
certainty.', 142 However, the situation with secrecy orders is different in that the
Article 33 time period of twenty years from filing is available as a matter of
certainty, but the effective period may be significantly shorter.
Even if there is no TRIPS compliance problem based on Article 33, there
could nonetheless be a problem based on Article 62 alone. In particular, Article 62
provides that members "may require, as a condition of the acquisition" of patent
143
rights under TRIPS, "compliance with reasonable procedures and formalities."'
This provision further states that members must permit the granting of a patent
right "within a reasonable period of time so as to avoid unwarrantedcurtailmentof
the periodofprotection."'144 The secrecy orders could result in an unwarranted and
substantial curtailment of the effective patent term, but it is presently unclear
whether such an order would alone run afoul of Article 62.
Even if there is a facial violation of the secrecy provisions under TRIPS
Article 62, the violation could be permissible pursuant to the "security exceptions"
clause under Article 73. The Clause states that nothing under TRIPS "shall be

GENERICS, supra note 54, at

7.104; see also supra note 58. In addition, unlike the case against India
where patents were not legally available, patents are technically available even where a secrecy order is
applied. Report of the Appellate Body, India - Patent Protectionfor Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural
ChemicalProducts, WT/DS50/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gensearch
.asp?searchmode=simple (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
139. GERVAIS, supra note 25, at 256 (noting that there was an attempt to extend protection).
140. The Appellate Body reviews appeals from panel proceedings pursuant to the DSU, but only if
one of the parties requests appeal. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Annex 2, art. 17, at 4 (1994) (noting that
parties may appeal panel decisions).
141. WTO, REPORT OF THE APPELLATE BODY: CANADA-TERM OF PATENT PROTECTION 2 (2000)
[hereinafter CANADA-TERM OF PATENT PROTECTION].
142. Id. at 90.
143. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 62(1) (emphasis added).
144. Id. at art. 62(2) (emphasis added).
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construed . . . to prevent a Member from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests ...taken in time of
war or other emergency in international relations."' 145 This provision has yet to be
officially interpreted in the context of TRIPS, but it has a close correspondence to a
provision in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which preceded
the WTO agreement. 146 Under the analogous provisions in GATT, economic
security interests alone were considered inadequate. Beyond that limited situation,
it has been suggested that Article 73 enables member states to decide for
themselves what constitutes a "national emergency," but the decision is subject to
review under the DSU. The discussion of Article 73 thus far focuses on the fact
that essential security interests extend beyond armed attack, but that the risk must
be "reasonable" and the measures designed to protect those interests must be
"necessary.' ' 147 Given that the secrecy orders are premised on some type of
national security problem analogous to armed attack - except with the use of
biological weapons - there may at least be a plausible basis for arguing that this
provision would apply.

III. ELIMINATING

THE SPECTRA OF PATENT PROBLEMS

There are a number of different ways to avoid or limit liability for patent
infringement. For example, the Patent Act specifies that a defendant may establish
noninfringement as well as invalidity of the patent. 148 Moreover, the Patent Act
notes that a proper defense would be "absence of liability for infringement," which
can include both a statutory exception under the Patent Act, as well as common
law defenses. 14 9 Although potential invalidity and noninfringement are viable

145. Id. at art. 73(b)(iii).
146. See WTO, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX: TRIPS: AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/bookspe/analyticindex
e/trips_03_e.htm#article73B (last visited Feb. 25, 2005) (noting that there has not yet been any
authoritative interpretation of TRIPS Article 73); GERVAIS, supra note 25, at 373 (noting that the
provision "essentially corresponds to Art. XX:I of the GATT"); UNCTAD/ICTSD CAPACITY BUILDING
PROJECT ON

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS

AND

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: TRIPS

AND

DEVELOPMENT: RESOURCE BOOK, PART Six: TRANSITIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS -

6.6 SECURITY EXCEPTIONS 3 (Jan. 2004), [hereinafter CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT] (noting that the
provision is almost identical to Article XXI of the GATT and Article XIV bis of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS)), http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ResourceBooklndex.htm (last
visited Feb. 27, 2005).
147. REICHMAN & HASENZAHL, supra note 91, at §2.2 (based upon a case before the International
Court of Justice). In particular, one suggestion is that security interests are necessary if there is some
proportionality between the threatened security interest and the measure taken in response to the threat.
Id.
148. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
149. Id.
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defenses in every patent infringement suit, establishing these defenses during
litigation can be both costly and time-consuming.150 A full analysis of those issues
requires a careful analysis of the particular patents and products - something that
would be difficult to do for all patents relating to biodefense vaccines and all
potential infringers. Accordingly, this section focuses on highlighting some
limitations and exceptions from infringement liability that seem most pertinent to
the development of biodefense vaccines. 151
A. Exceptions to Infringement
1. Absolute State Sovereign Immunity
One exception that may be relevant for use and distribution of vaccines is that
states presently enjoy immunity from patent infringement with no requirement to
compensate for the loss of federal patent rights. In particular, the United States
Supreme Court has struck down Congressional attempts to abrogate state sovereign
immunity with respect to patent infringement.152 Although there have been some
legislative proposals to reverse this position, 153 until such legislation is passed,
state governments can make, use, and import vaccines without full liability for
patent infringement. 154 In addition, because state universities are considered state

150. Another defense that may often be made is that the patent is unenforceable because of
inequitable conduct by the patent applicant, sometimes referred to as "fraud on the patent office." See
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING

PROCEDURE § 2016 (8th ed., rev. 2 2004). However, again, this is a defense that requires a detailed
analysis of the patent at issue and is beyond the scope of this article.
151. There are some exceptions to the Patent Act that have no applicability to the vaccine context.
For example, there is a limited exception with respect to business method patents, as well as an
exception from damages for medical procedure patents. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(3)(a) (providing
for a limited prior use defense in the case of business method patents); 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (providing
that medical providers are immune from damages for using certain types of patented medical
procedures).
152. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643-44
(1999). The decision actually held that there was no procedural due process violation in depriving the
patent owner of his property right in a patent. Id. at 647-48. Rather, the Court stated that only if a state
"provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies" could a deprivation of property without due process
result. Id. at 643. In this case, the state of Florida provided remedies to patent owners either through a
statutory claim or through a judicial takings claim. Id. at 644 n. 9. In addition, the Court noted that
despite lack of a federal remedy, states might still be liable for some state-based remedy pursuant to a
taking of property rationale. Id. at 643. However, commentators have criticized such a proposal as
unlikely or at least not uniformly available in every situation where a patent would be infringed.
153. E.g., S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2344, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2031, 107th Cong.
(2002); S. 1611, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1835, 106th Cong. (1999).
154. The issue of state sovereign immunity is actually a complex one. Although there is technically
state sovereign immunity, there is also the possibility that state officials could be prospectively enjoined
from infringement under the Ex parte Young doctrine. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 136-37 (1908);
see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual
Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2001). Although the Supreme Court narrowed this decision in
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actors, they would also have immunity from patent infringement. 155 This may be
of particular relevance because universities often engage in research, but the
infringement for experimental academic research has
perceived exception from
56
recently been narrowed. 1
If many states were to make patented vaccines under the present immunity
provision, it is possible that a subsequent court challenge might find the use to be
impermissible. In particular, the Supreme Court noted that the Congressional
attempt to revoke sovereign immunity did not respond to a history of "widespread
and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights."' 57 In light of the current health
care crises that are prompting some state governors to suggest importing patented
drugs in violation of typical patent infringement rights, it is possible that state
patent infringement will rise, particularly if coupled with extensive use of patented
vaccines. 158
recent years, the doctrine continues to exist. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh
Amendment, and the PotentialEvisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV 495, 496-513 (1997);
see also Christina Bohannan & Thomas F. Cotter, When the State Steals Ideas: Is the Abrogation of
State Sovereign Immunity from Federal Infringement Claims Constitutional in Light of Seminole
Tribe?, 467 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1438-39 (1999)) (noting that injunctive relief is probably still
available for ongoing, unauthorized uses of intellectual property by state actors unless those uses
constitute takings for a public purpose despite recent Supreme Court cases). Moreover, there is also the
possibility that state use of a patent would ultimately require compensation to the patent owner, albeit
not under the patent statute. In particular, inverse condemnation theory or other "takings" rationales, as
well as § 1983 actions, would govern these situations. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 29, at 1404 (noting
alternatives to injunctive relief, including inverse condemnation, in actions as well as state court
remedies); Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual Property: The Path
Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637, 665-66 (2000). See
generally Paul J. Heald & Michael L.Wells, Remedies for the Misappropriationof IntellectualProperty
by State and Municipal Governments Before and After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and
OtherImmunity Doctrines, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849 (1998). Moreover, there is also the possibility
that a state would consent to suit since there are reported cases where states are defendants in
infringement suits. E.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1448-49 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
155. Indeed, the defendant in the case in which the Supreme Court declared that state sovereign
immunity was not abrogated in the context of patent infringement suits was a state university. Florida
Prepaid,527 U.S. at 630 (noting that College Savings, the plaintiff, "sued the State of Florida" for
patent infringement).
156. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing experimental use since Madey v. Duke,
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir 2002)).
157. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 628. In response to the Supreme Court decision, the GAO
commissioned a report concerning state infringement, which provides an exhaustive catalog of data
concerning intellectual property infringement. Robert T. Neufeld, Closing Federalism's Loophole in
Intellectual Property Rights, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1295, 1310-11 (2002); see also GAO,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: STATE IMMUNITY IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS, REP. NO. 01-811 (2001),

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0181 .pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
158. Although some states are merely providing consumers with information to import their own
drugs, other states, such as Illinois, seem to favor buying drugs for at least some of their citizens. E.g.,
Pam Belluck, Maine and One of Its Tribes Look to Buy CanadianDrugs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,2004, at
A12 (noting that Illinois, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Wisconsin have set up
websites to link consumers to Canadian pharmacies); Marilyn Werber Serafini, The Other Drug War,
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2. TRIPS
State immunity from patent infringement poses possible problems under
TRIPS. In the case of state use of patented inventions, or importation of patented
vaccines, there seems to be a clear facial violation of the Article 28 right to exclude
under TRIPS. 159 The only issue then would be whether state immunity can be
excused under one of the exceptions. The limited commentary available on
possible TRIPS noncompliance thus far has focused primarily on Article 31,
probably since this is the provision that is commonly associated with compulsory
licensing. 16 However, since Article 31 technically only applies to use that is
outside the scope of Article 30, this part briefly addresses Article 30 first.
a. Article 30
As explained in the Canada-Generic Medicines case, Article 30 requires that
the deviation from the standard patent rights be a "limited exception," in addition
to two other separate inquiries. It is difficult to conceive of an argument that state
sovereign immunity is "limited" - especially in the context of the Canada-Generic
Medicines case holding that Canada's actions were not limited. In particular, the
WTO Panel found that Canada's stockpiling provision that enabled generic
manufacturers to make and stockpile patented drugs during the last six months of
the patent term was not adequately limited where there were no limits on the
quantities of patented product that could be made. In contrast, there are no
temporal or quantity limits to state immunity - rather, under present law, states can
infringe as much as they want for the entire duration of the patent. 16 1 Moreover,
unlike the case before the WTO, state sovereign immunity allows infringement of
any patented invention by the state, rather than a more focused subset of
inventions. Based on the Canada-Generic Medicines case, this would seem to
clearly fail the "limited" exception requirement, such that the other two parts of the
Article 30 analysis need not even be addressed.

NAT'L J.,

Mar. 20, 2004 (noting that Illinois governor Blagojevich had suggested importing drugs for

state employees, as well as for the state corrections systems and mental hospitals). In addition, there
seems to be a growing impetus behind importing drugs. E.g., Robert Pear, Bush Hints at Policy Shift on
CanadianDrug Imports, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.12, 2004, at A20 (noting that there may soon be an official
change in policy towards importation of drugs).
159. As noted earlier, TRIPS requires that all member states provide patent rights that enable patent
owners to have the ability to exclude all others from making, using, selling, or importing the patented
invention, subject to falling within the stated exceptions to patent rights under Articles 30 and 31. See
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing procedural requirements for obtaining an
exception to exclusion rights).
161. However, it is possible that a state could be enjoined from infringement under the Ex parte
Young doctrine or be liable under state-based theories. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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b. Article 31
State sovereign immunity from patent infringement also seemingly fails to
fall within the parameters of Article 31. Although Article 31 is occasionally noted
as a potential TRIPS problem because of state immunity, there has been little
detailed discussion.1 62 However, a quick review of a few provisions of Article 31
shows that state immunity is probably not justified under this exception. 63 For
example, state immunity does not mandate initial negotiation with the patent
holder before compulsory use. Although Article 31 provides for some situations
where the negotiation may be waived, there must be a "national emergency" or
other situation of urgency. In addition, even in those cases, the patent owner must
be informed. Current state immunity doctrine imposes no requirement that the
patent owner is ever informed that his/her patent is being used without
authorization, and there is no requirement to consider whether a national
emergency exists.
Even if protecting the doctrine of state immunity were somehow justified as
an issue of extreme emergency, none of the other requirements of Article 31 seem
to be satisfied. For example, there is no consideration of individual cases on their
own merits; rather, in all cases where the state is involved, a compulsory license is
always permissible.
Similarly, there seems to be no judicial review of
"authorization of use" since there is no authorization that actually even needs to
take place. Also, there is no clear system of adequate remuneration to the right
holder. Although the Supreme Court asserted that there were possible monetary
remedies for patent holders, the Court was contemplating possibilities outside the
scope of patent law. It is questionable whether such remedies - to the extent they
even exist - would be sufficient to fit the adequate remuneration provision.
3. FederalGovernment
At present, there is no general statutory provision or doctrine that enables the
federal government to use all patented inventions without qualification. However,
there are two specific statutory exceptions that do give the federal government
substantial leeway in using patented inventions.
The first statutory
exception/provision is a patent provision created under the Bayh-Dole Act, while
the second exception is established in the judicial code.

162. For example, without analyzing every element of Article 31, Professor Menell stated that the
remaining "hodge podge of potential remedies" available to patent owners under state law in the wake
of FloridaPrepaidaffirmatively "would fall below . . . Article 31 criteria." Meneil, supra note 29, at
1452.
163. Probably the only Article 31 requirement that is met with state sovereign immunity is the
requirement that it not be a use permitted under Article 30. See TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 31; see

also Part lII.A.2.a. (describing why Article 30 does not provide an exception from liability).
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a. Bayh-Dole - Government License
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, the federal government may obtain rights to use
inventions that are entirely or partially funded by a federal agency. In particular,
as a result of the Bayh-Dole Act, those who receive such federal money 164 are
generally permitted to "take title," i.e., own the invention, 65 subject to providing a
license to the federal government to use the invention.166 Specifically, for all
inventions made in the course of federally-funded research, the government retains
a "nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid up license" to use the
invention, or have it used "for or on behalf of the United States."' 167 Essentially,
this enables the federal government to use any patented technology that it funded,
without regard to the type of technology or the amount of government funding.
Similarly, the use is permitted regardless of whether the patent is subsequently
assigned to a university or even a corporate entity.
The statutory framework of Bayh-Dole does not seem to create any major
TRIPS issues. In particular, because the statute provides that a license should issue

164. 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). Although the statute refers only to nonprofits and small business
firms, it has been extended to cover essentially all entities, including large businesses. See Patents;
Temporary Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,254 (Apr. 15, 1983) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. ch.1)
(providing for extension of act "beyond small businesses and non-profit organizations"); Executive
Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr. 10, 1987) (further extending scope to businesses of any
size); 15 U.S.C. § 1501; 35 U.S.C. § 210(c). However, the original drafters of the Bayh-Dole Act
specifically rejected attempts to include large businesses within the scope of the provisions. Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in
Government-SponsoredResearch, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1695-96 (1996).
165. There are certain procedural requirements that must be satisfied. For example, the claim to
title must happen two years from when the entity discloses the invention to the federal agency. 35
U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (2000). Otherwise, the federal agency receives title to the invention. Id. In
addition, the statute provides that in "exceptional circumstances" the government maintains the right to
deny title to the invention. Id.§ 202(a). However, it appears that this has only been utilized once.
NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE SOLICITATION, MOLECULAR TARGET LABORATORIES, reprintedin COM.

Bus. DAILY, Feb. 24, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8961813.
166. When it was enacted in 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act was intended to promote widespread
utilization of inventions funded with federal money by eliminating a Byzantine system of procedures
that previously were required before contractors could take title. In particular, the sponsors of the
legislation believed that patent ownership would help motivate private investors to transform the results
of government research into commercial products. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000); see also Kenneth Sutherlin
Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed Biomedical
Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 461 (1997); David Halperin, The Bayh Dole Act and MarchIn Rights (May 2001), http://ott.od.nih.gov/Meeting/David-Halperin-Attomey-Counselor.pdf (last
visited Feb. 25, 2005); GAO, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: AGENCIES' RIGHTS TO FEDERALLY SPONSORED
BIOMEDICAL INVENTIONS, GAO-03-536, at 3-4 (2003) [hereinafter GAO TECH. TRANSFER],
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03536.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005). Although Bayh-Dole has
generally been hailed as effective in promoting patents and furthering commercial development of
federally funded inventions, some have questioned whether the balance should be fine-tuned, at least in
the case of upstream innovations. E.g., Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and
the Progressof Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 291 (2003).
167. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000).
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to the United States, this should be consistent with the TRIPS rights to exclude all
unauthorized users from the patented invention. 68 Although it may have some of
the "feel" of a compulsory license, the situation is in fact the reverse - the right to
patent ownership is provided as more of a gift to the contractor to spur innovation,
subject only to the small license provided to the United States. Since the grant of
the patent is made subject to the license, the relationship is contractual rather than
an involuntary license.
b. Limited FederalImmunity- 28 U.SC. § 1498
There is a statutory provision within the judiciary code rather than the
Patent Act that enables the federal government, as well as its government
contractors, to essentially infringe patents at will without fear of injunction., 69 In
particular, the federal government and those working for it have an absolute right
to use, without any possibility of being enjoined, 170 subject only to having to pay
"reasonable and entire compensation" afterwards if the patent owner brings a suit
for such compensation. 17' Although the government may have to provide some
compensation for its use (unlike the use of patents funded from federal money
under Bayh-Dole), there is no liability pursuant to a typical patent infringement
action. Rather, the only recourse for a patent owner is to sue in the appropriate
1 72
forum for compensation after the injury has occurred.

168. See TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 28 (noting that the right to exclude only applies to third
parties "not having the owner's consent").
169. Most authorities assume that this provision is based on eminent domain principles. E.g.,
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Leesona Corp. v. United
States, 599 F.2d 958, 966 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see also Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of
Cipro: A Reevaluation of Compensation Rules for Government Takings of PatentRights, 40 AM. Bus.
L.J. 125, 139-40 (2002) (asserting that the provision is "primarily a jurisdictional statute" that waives
government immunity from private suit). However, at least one commentator has suggested that
whether the Takings Clause covers patents is "technically, an unsettled question." Robert C. Wilmoth,
Toward a Congruent and ProportionalPatent Law: Redressing State PatentInfringement After Florida
Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 519, 564 (2002); see also Odetics, Inc. v. Storage
Technology Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 793 n. 22 (E.D. Va. 1998) (noting that "infringement by the
government is more akin to a taking") (emphasis added). In addition, although there is a case that
specifically states that this provision is not an eminent domain proceeding, it nonetheless notes that it
has a similar theoretical basis and does not question that there is authority for its enactment. De
Graffenried v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 384, 386-89 (1993) (noting that section 1498 cannot constitute
an eminent domain proceeding in a technical sense because the United States has not taken any
property).
170. E.g., Trojan, Inc. v. Shat-R-Shield, Inc., 885 F.2d 854, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that "[a]
supplier or potential supplier of an infringing productfor the government is 'immune' from injunctive
relief") (citing W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281-82 (Fed. Cir. 1988));
Garlock, 842 F.2d at 1283 (noting that "[t]hough injunctions may seem to say that making for and
selling to the government is forbidden, injunctions based on patent rights cannot in reality do that
because of 1498(a)").
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
172. Id.
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The actors who are potentially covered by this provision are quite broad
since the statute refers to unauthorized use "by or for the United States.' 73 Use by
the federal government includes various government agencies,174 contractors, and
subcontractors. 175
This provision is not limited to any particular type of invention or specific
use and there are also no procedural requirements that must precede government
use. Accordingly, when former Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
services, Tommy Thompson, announced during the anthrax scare that the United
States had the authority to "break" the Cipro patent and produce generic versions
1 77
1 76
without Bayer's permission, he was in fact correct under this law.
Even though § 1498 of the Judiciary Code may provide authority under
United States law, it is questionable whether this provision complies with either of
the TRIPS exceptions to patent rights. 178 As an initial matter, unauthorized use of
the patented invention would violate the Article 28 right to exclude. Accordingly,
the issue is whether this provision can be justified under Article 30 or Article 31.
Although the few commentators that have discussed TRIPS compliance with this
provision have assumed that Article 31 is the only exception to apply, 179 Article 31
explicitly states that it only applies to use not covered by Article 30.180 As with the

173. Id.
174. A report by the National Institutes of Health in fact relied upon this provision in stating, "As a
government agency, NIH may use and manufacture any patented invention, whether or not developed
with federal funds, and authorize its use and manufacture by others for the United States, without a
license, subject to liability for 'reasonable and entire compensation' under 28 U.S.C. § 1498." REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (June 4, 1998),
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1498. The origin of this provision was to relieve government contractors entirely
from potential patent liability in the context of an ongoing war when this provision was enacted in
1918. Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 345 (1927); Robishaw
Engineering, Inc. v. United States, 891 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 n.10 (E.D. Va. 1995) (noting that the
provision was enacted in response to difficulties encountered by military officials in procuring
necessary goods from private manufacturers). See also 48 C.F.R. § 27.104(c) (2003) (noting that "by
appropriate contract clauses" the government authorizes and consents to such use of inventions in
performing government contracts "even though the inventions may be covered by U.S. patents..
176. Carroll & Winslow, supranote 14.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1498; see also Memorandum from Al Engelberg supra note 7 (providing
extensive legal analysis regarding authority for compulsory licenses of Cipro under 28 U.S.C. § 1498).
178. Indeed, this issue was occasionally raised as a potential problem in the context of the anthrax
scare.
179. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text. Some discussions do not even clearly
articulate which provision of TRIPS would be relevant. For example, one recent report by the
Chemical & Biological Arms Control Institute (CBAI) provided an extensive discussion of legal issues
necessary to develop a national vaccine strategy, but only discussed a possible TRIPS problem in
passing. BIODEFENSE ROAD MAP, supra note 15, at 32-33 (noting that "[t]he government does have the
right to use patents with a license [and] this goes against the spirit of.. .TRIPS.").
180. TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 31.
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TRIPS analysis of state sovereign immunity, the Article 30 exception will be
analyzed first.
(i) Article 30
Limited Exception
The threshold question for Article 30 analysis is whether § 1498 constitutes a
"limited exception." As previously discussed, the sole WTO Panel to address the
definition of this provision specified that a limited exception must be limited in
scope. This provision presents a similar problem to state sovereign immunity with
respect to the fact that there is no limit to the duration of infringement or quantity
of infringing product. Given that the stockpiling provision was held impermissible
under Article 30 for failing to be sufficiently limited even when its scope was
confined to the last six months of the patent term, the lack of any temporal limits
on § 1498 would not appear sufficiently limited. It could be argued, however, that
the stockpiling comparison is not entirely apt since there was no compensation
provided in the case of stockpiling, whereas § 1498 does explicitly provide for
some compensation, thus making the provision arguably more limited. It is still
difficult to reconcile the broad scope of § 1498 with the Panel requirement that this
be applicable to "small" exceptions. However, assuming this could be justified as
limited, the next two prongs of Article 30 will be analyzed.
UnreasonableConflict with Normal Exploitation?
As with the "limited exception" requirement, what constitutes "normal
exploitation" of a patent is difficult to determine because the Panel ruling was factspecific. Normal exploitation in the Canada-Generics Medicines case involved a
de facto extension of patent monopoly. However, here the issue would likely be
whether normal exploitation would include having the government or one of its
contractors use the patented invention at will, subject only to paying a royalty after
the fact. In addition, the Panel did not define what constitutes an unreasonable
conflict. Although this provision is probably not met, there is also no dispositive
answer, such that the final provision of Article 30 - whether there is unreasonable
prejudice to the legitimate interests of the patent owner - will be considered.

UnreasonablePrejudiceto Legitimate Interests of PatentOwner, Taking
into Account Third PartyInterests
As with the "normal exploitation" language, there remains the question of
what constitutes a legitimate interest of the patent owner. Legitimate interest in the
Canada-Generics case seems not to include having the same effective term of
patent protection as other patented inventions; however, this does not seem to be
an issue with respect to § 1498. The patent owner's interests in making the best
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commercial use of the invention would seem to be prejudiced here. Whether the
patent owner's interests are unreasonably prejudiced is difficult to determine.
Also, it is unclear whether third party interests change the analysis. Unlike the
case of patent protection of pharmaceuticals, government use under § 1498 would
not provide any immediate consumer benefit. It could be argued that § 1498
ensures that monopoly-like prices are not charged for government projects that
involve patented inventions. However, this could nonetheless constitute
unreasonable prejudice.
(ii) Article 31
A quick review shows that § 1498 is unlikely to comply with all the
requirements of Article 31. 181 The explicit language of § 1498 seems to be a close
fit for the types of situations governed by Article 31; in particular, Article 31
addresses use by "government or third parties authorized by the government,"
which is very similar to the language and intent of § 1498.182 However, with
respect to the procedural conditions that must be met before granting an authorized
compulsory license under Article 31, § 1498 does not come close. In contrast to
Article 31 's requirements of consideration of the individual merits of the invention,
as well as a limited duration of use, the loose language of § 1498 provides for "no
waiting period . . . no formalities . . . no notice to the patent holder . . . no

hearing." 183 Although Article 31 does permit use without the patent owner's
permission in some situations, those situations are limited to cases of emergency or
national urgency, neither of which is required by § 1498.184
4. Limited Exceptionsfor All Actors
Whereas the previous two sections focused on exceptions that only apply to
either state or federal government, this section discusses two exceptions that apply

181. Not surprisingly, some commentators have already stated that § 1498 fails to comply with
TRIPS Article 31. E.g., James Thuo Gathii, The StructuralPower of Strong PharmaceuticalPatent
Protection in U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 267, 281-82 (2003) (arguing the United
States has used its power for strong patent protection, thereby limiting the capability of developing
nations to treat their citizens); Paul Janicke, Current State of U.S. Patent Law Regarding Infringement
of Drug Patentsby the Government (2001), at http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlawperspectives/Food/
01 1207Current.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (noting that § 1498 is in "full force and effect," despite
its apparent contradiction to Article 31). In addition, the fact that § 1498 fails to comply with Article 31
has been noticed by at least one member state of the WTO. See, e.g. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT
ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT, (Dec. 2003), available at http://trade-

info.cec.eu.int/doclib/htmlI/ 15383.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (discussing the failure of the United
States to comply with Article 31).
182. Compare TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 31 with 28 U.S.C. § 1498.
183. Janicke, supra note 181.
184. Compare TRIPS supranote 24, at art. 31 with 28 U.S.C. § 1498. Moreover, even where use is
permitted without initial consultation of the patent owner, the patent owner must be notified as soon as
possible - another condition that is not required under the United States statute. Id.
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to all actors. In general both of these exceptions are much more narrow than the
ones that presently exist for government actors. They are nonetheless of great
importance to non-governmental actors who have no recourse from liability under
the other provisions. In addition, even for governmental actors, these provisions
may prove to be highly relevant to the extent that the present governmental
exceptions or immunities are eliminated, either by judicial action or because of
problems with TRIPS.
a. March-In Rights
The first exception is part of the Bayh-Dole Act, which, as previously
discussed, provides the government with a right to use patented inventions funded
with federal money.185 In addition to the compulsory license to the federal
government, there is an additional exception from patent liability for nongovernmental actors in some instances. The federal agency that funded the
invention has the right to grant a non-exclusive license to a "responsible applicant
or applicants" on terms that are "reasonable under the circumstances" if one or
more conditions exist that would require protecting the public's interest."' The
rights that the federal agency may grant are commonly referred to as "march-in"
rights and are intended to prevent abuses of rights provided by the Bayh-Dole
legislation. In particular, because Bayh-Dole was intended to "promote the
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development,"' 18 7 the march-in provisions were designed to "ensure that the
Government . . . protect[s] the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of
inventions."'' 8 8 There are two primary provisions that may trigger march-in rights:
(1) where the contractor or assignee "has not taken, or is not expected to take
within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application of the
subject invention," or (2) "to alleviate health or safety needs' 89which are not
reasonably satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or their licensees."'

185. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
186. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000). In particular, the statute provides that the federal agency can require
the grant of reasonable licenses to third parties if it finds (1) that the contractor failed to take effective
steps in a reasonable amount of time to achieve practical application of the invention; (2) that a license
is needed to alleviate health and safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor; (3)
that a license is needed to meet requirements for public use specified by federal regulations which are
not reasonably satisfied by the contractor; (4) that a license is needed to insure that the invention is
substantially manufactured in the United States. Id.
187. 35 U.S.C. § 200.
188. Id.
189. 35 U.S.C. § 203 (emphasis added). Although there are two additional provisions that may
technically trigger march-in rights, the referenced provisions are the ones that have been repeatedly
cited in the actual petitions. The other provisions are more procedural issues and do not specifically
implicate public health and safety. See id.

2005]

INOCULATION INVENTIONS

Although there has been scholarly commentary suggesting that march-in
rights could be more aggressively used to address health care costs, 190 the NIH has
yet to grant a petition for march-in rights.' 91 The first petition for march-in rights
was filed by CellPro in 1997, on the basis that the patent holder had failed to take
effective steps to ensure practical application of the invention since CellPro was
the only one to be selling an FDA-approved device within the scope of the patent
claims. 192 The NIH denied the petition, 193 which allegedly contributed to the
bankruptcy of CellPro, 194 and prompted discussion of the march-in rights
legislation. 195 Some commentators have expressed optimism for the potential
utility of march-in rights, based on the fact that CellPro involved some unique
circumstances, such as the fact that the march-in request was made after CellPro
had both turned down an opportunity to license the invention, and been found to
196
willfully infringe.

190. E.g., Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price
Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable PricingRequirements Imposed upon Patents
Deriving in Whole or in Partfrom FederallyFunded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631, 659-67 (2001);
Jerome H. Reichman, Testimony Before NIH Public Hearing on March-in Rights under the Bayh-Dole
Act (May 25, 2004), http://essentialinventions.org/drug/nih05252004/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
191. Indeed, it may be that march-in rights have never been granted by any federal agency. GAO
TECH. TRANSFER, supra note 166, at 5 (noting that it is believed that the government has never invoked
march-in rights).
192. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 189 (D. Del. 1997) (noting that CellPro
obtained FDA approval for its system in December 1996, before any of the licensees of the Johns
Hopkins University); Avital Bar-Shalom & Robert Cook-Deegan, Patents and Innovation in Cancer
Therapeutics:Lessons from CellPro, 80 MILBANK Q. 637, 638, 652 (2002) (noting that CellPro was the
first time any federal agency was petitioned to march in to compel licensing).
193. Harold Varmus, National Institutes of Health, Determination in the Case of Petition of CellPro,
Inc. (Aug. 1, 1997), http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/aug97/nihb-Ol.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
194. Luke Timmerman, Biotech Patent Policy Muscled Away Future of Once-Bright CellPro,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at Fl (discussing CellPro's case as an example of problems with patent
law); Bar-Shalom & Cook-Deegan, supra note 192, at 638 (discussing the CellPro bankruptcy).
195. E.g., Bar-Shalom & Cook-Deegan, supra note 192; Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey,
Patents, Products, and Public Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-in Petition, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1095, 1108-09 (1999); Peter Mikhail, Hopkins v. CellPro: An Illustration that Patentingand
Exclusive Licensing of FundamentalScience is Not Always in the Public Interest, 13 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 375 (2000); Tamsen Valoir, Government Funded Inventions: The Bayh-Dole Act and the
Hopkins v. CellPro March-in Rights Controversy, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 211 (2000). See also
Gretchen Dunbar, Comment, 'Real as Pro Wrestling': Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro and the
Federal Court's Power of Review in Patent Infringement Actions, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 275 (2002) (focusing on the impact of court review of jury verdicts on the CellPro
case).

196. Moreover, at the time the NIH decided the march-in petition, there was no injunction on
CellPro's sales of the infringing devices; rather the court had stayed imposition of a permanent
injunction until there was an alternative device sold on the market. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro,
Inc., No. 94-105-RRM (D. Del. July 24, 1997); see also Bar-Shalom & Cook-Deegan, supra note 192,
at 645 (describing the complex situation surrounding CellPro's infringement, including its belief on the
advice of legal counsel that the patents at issue were invalid); McGarey & Levey, supra note 195, at
1108-09.
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The NIH, however, has recently dashed hopes that march-in rights could help
alleviate soaring health care costs by denying two separate petitions. In July 2004,
the NIH denied the march-in petition by a non-profit company, Essential
Inventions, to manufacture the drug Ritonavir 97 The NIH rejected the contention
that Abbott Laboratories's 400 % price increase on the cost of the drug, also called
98
Norvir, constituted a denial of health needs that justified march-in rights.'
Rather, the NIH considered march-in rights to be an "extraordinary remedy" that
"is not an appropriate means of controlling drug prices." 199 By characterizing the
petition as an "issue of drug pricing" the NIH suggested that the issue was one that
extended beyond march-in rights and had "global implications," such that it should
be "appropriately left for Congress to address legislatively."200 The NIH took
similar action in September 2004 with respect to a petition to utilize march-in
rights for Xalantan, which is priced higher in the United States than other
countries. 20 1 The NIH reiterated the position that march-in rights are 20extraordinary
2
remedies for drug prices and that the issue should be left to Congress.
b. Experimental Use
As stated by the Federal Circuit, the typical court of last resort in patent
litigation cases, the common law doctrine of experimental use in the United States
is "truly narrow." 20 3 Contrary to lay perceptions, there is no general exception for
experimentation on patented compounds. 20 4 Courts have repeatedly declared the
doctrine unavailable when there is any connection with a commercial enterprise.
For example, experiments to determine whether the patented invention works 20 5 as

197. According to its petition, Essential Inventions is a "private, not-for-profit corporation" that was

organized in January 2004 to "support the creation of and access to Essential Inventions, including
Petition to Use Authority Under Bayh-Dole Act to Promote Access to Ritonavir,
medicines."
Supported by National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Contract No. A127220 2 (Jan. 29,
2004) [hereinafter Essential Inventions Petition], http://www.essentialinventions.org/legal/norvir/norvir
-29janO4petition.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
198. Elias A. Zerhouni, National Institutes of Health, Determination in the Case of Petition of
Essential Inventions 5-6 (July 29, 2004) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law and Policy).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 6.
201. Elias A. Zerhouni, National Institutes of Health, Determination in the Case of Petition of
Xalantan (Sept. 17, 2004), http://ott.od.nih.gov/NewPages/xalatan.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
202. Id. at 5-6.
203. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
204. For example, the Federal Circuit in Madey v. Duke Univ. noted that there are few cases
evaluating experimental use and that the lower court could have been led astray by at least one other
opinion that improperly analyzed the scope of experimental use. 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(noting that the district court's reliance on Ruth v. Steams-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697, 713 (D.
Colo. 1935) was inconsistent with prior Federal Circuit precedent).
205. Pitcaim v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Eyal H. Barash, Comment,
Experimental Uses, Patents, andScientific Progress,92 Nw. U. L. REV. 667,687-88 (1997).
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well as experiments to improve on the patented invention have been deemed
infringement. 206 An oft-quoted characterization is that the experimental use
exception only covers experiments conducted "for amusement, to satisfy idle
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry., 20 7 Accordingly, any use of a
patented invention remotely related to development of a commercial vaccine, even
if at an early stage of development, would be unlikely to fall within the parameters
of this narrow exception.
Contrary to a long-held belief by many university administrators,
experiments conducted on the campuses of non-profit educational institutions are
not per se immune from patent infringement, as the Federal Circuit recently
clarified in the case Madey v. Duke University.20 8 The Federal Circuit did not
completely dismiss the relevance of an institution's status as a non-profit
institution, but in finding that the district court had placed undue reliance on this
factor, 20 9 the Federal Circuit also provided further limitations that could negate the
possibility of experimental use in most cases. The boundaries of experimental use
seem further restricted by the court's announcement in Madey that:
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an
endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is infurtherance of the
alleged infringer's legitimate business and is not solelyfor amusement,
to satisfy idle curiosity, orfor strictly philosophicalinquiry, the act does
not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use
defense.21 °
In this particular case, the court opined that as a major research university,
even experiments with "arguably no commercial applications whatsoever" may
still fail to be within the parameters of experimental use to the extent that they
"further the institution's legitimate business objectives., 211 Specifically, the court
considered such objectives to include educating students and faculty, as well as

206. E.g., Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1348-50 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(limiting the scope of the Bolar exception under 271(e)(1) to only apply to experiments conducted
specifically for FDA approval, but not covering experiments to identify the best drug candidate to
submit for future clinical testing for eventual FDA approval).
207. Roche, 733 F.2d. at 863; see generally Madey, 307 F.3d 1351.
208. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does The Public Get?
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81, 85 (2004) (noting that "Madey
contradicted a belief widespread in the research community ... that all nonprofit research was exempt
from infringement liability."); GAO TECH. TRANSFER, supra note 166, at 11-13 (noting that although
some researchers believed that use of patented technology for "purely scientific endeavors" was exempt
from patent infringement and that patent owners reported a "gentleman's agreement" not to pursue such
research for infringement, the Madey v. Duke Univ. decision may undermine prior belief that scientific
research was exempt). But if the educational institution is a state university, the immunities previously
discussed would be relevant. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
209. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
210. Id. (emphasis added).
211. Id.
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increasing the status212of the institution and luring "lucrative research grants,
students and faculty.,
Although the scope of experimental use under common law is now
incredibly narrow, there are at least no substantial TRIPS issues. In particular,
although experimental use would technically be an impermissible infringement of
Article 28 rights, it is likely justified under Article 30. Commentators have long
assumed that Article 30 covered experimental use, however defined by individual
countries. 2 13 Moreover, although the Canada-Generic Medicines case technically
did not rule on this issue, it did suggest that this type of use would be permissible
under Article 30.214
B. Other Limitations to PatentLiability
This final section addresses possible limitations to patent liability that may be
relevant if none of the exceptions discussed in the previous section are applicable.
Whereas the prior section discussed specific common law and statutory exceptions
to infringement, this section discusses potential limitations to full patent liability.
For instance, the first example discussed is a limited equitable practice of not
imposing injunctions for patent infringement when doing so would be contrary to
public health needs. As discussed in this section, this is subject to the discretion of
individual judges, which represents a less reliable means of minimizing patent
liability than any of the exceptions discussed in the foregoing section. In addition,
this section also considers the possibility of new statutory limitations based on past
Congressional action as well as present obligations under TRIPS. Although there
is no pending legislation that would create exceptions to patent liability with regard
to biodefense vaccines in particular, this section provides a brief sketch of
domestic and international issues that should be considered if such exceptions are
seriously contemplated.
1. Infringement without Injunction
The first type of limitation does not provide immunity from patent
infringement charges, but does provide a possible limit to the extent of liability
with respect to damages. In particular, the Patent Act explicitly states that in cases
of unauthorized infringement, the patentee shall be awarded damages that provide
at least a "reasonable royalty. '215 Accordingly, if none of the exceptions discussed

212. Id.
213. See CANADA-GENERICS, supra note 54, at 4.37. In addition, prior drafts of Article 30
explicitly suggested the inclusion of experimental use. GERVAIS, supra note 25, at 241.
214. CANADA-GENERICS, supranote 54, at 4.37.
215. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (stating that "[ulpon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer .... ") (emphasis added).
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in the previous section are applicable, a court must impose some type of monetary
damages.
However, a court does have discretion within its equity powers to decide
whether to impose an injunction on infringing activity where it finds a defendant to
be infringing a patent. El6 The possibility that an injunction may not be imposed
could be very important if a patented invention is used for widespread vaccination
that could be halted by imposition of a preliminary or permanent injunction.
This possibility, however, is fairly remote in most cases. Although there is
some precedence for courts to decline to impose such injunctions, recent cases
typically assert that a permanent injunction should be part of the patent owner's
right once infringement is established.2E 7 The cases in which courts decline to
impose injunctions are rare, typically requiring a situation where imposition of an
injunction would cause actual public harm; 218 however, economic harm to a
defendant is not considered to be a public harm.2 1 9 In addition, because those cases

216. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000) (providing that courts "may grant injunctions in accordance with
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the
court deems reasonable") (emphasis added).
217. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that "[i]t is the
general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound reason
for denying it."); KSM Fastening Systems, Inc. v. H.A. Jones Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that "injunctive relief against an infringer is the norm"). See also Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes
Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that without the right to exclude, the express
purpose of "the Constitution and Congress, to promote the progress of the useful arts, would be
seriously undermined").
218. There are two famous but very dated cases that are oft-cited for this point. Vitamin
Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1944) (declining to
issue an injunction where it would have resulted in higher incidence of rickets); Milwaukee v. Activated
Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934) (denying injunctive relief where requested relief would
have closed the city sewage plant and resulted in the dumping of raw sewage into public areas, resulting
in a clear public health hazard). See also Continental Paper Bag Co. v Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S.
405, 424-30 (1908) (declining to rule on whether a court might be justified in withholding relief by
injunction in "view of the public interest"). The fact that there are no recent cases underscores their
exceptionality. This is particularly true since the Federal Circuit was created after these decisions and it
has created precedence for a stronger presumption of permanent as well as preliminary injunctions.
See, e.g., Smith International,718 F.2d at 1581 (holding that where patent has been found valid and
infringed, irreparable harm is presumed for purpose of issuing preliminary injunction); see also
MERGES & DUFFY, PATENT LAW, 1056-57 (2003) (noting that the creation of the Federal Circuit has
substantially increased the number of preliminary injunction motions granted, such that the number
granted now exceeds 60%).
219. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15003, at **5 (D. Mass. 1986), affid, 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (granting an injunction against
infringer, without regard to fact that the injunction would result in job loss to 800 full-time and 3,700
part-time employees, as well as result in substantial financial losses to the defendant). In addition, even
if an injunction will put a defendant out of business, it is not considered a public policy problem. E.g.,
Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v AMF, Inc. 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (refusal of district court to
grant injunction because it might put the defendant out of business was abuse of discretion); Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 196 (D. Del. 1997) (trebling the damages for patent
infringement even though defendant was relatively small company).

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 8:1]:11 1

are dated, a present court may be disinclined to follow what may represent
antiquated precedent. However, there is some recent authority for courts to deny
preliminary injunctive relief or to temporarily stay the imposition of a permanent
injunction in the interests of public health if the infringing product is the only
available product. 220 Often in these cases courts will allow the injunction to be
stayed not only until a new product is available, but also for an additional small
22
period of time to enable patients to transition to a new product. '
2. Explicit New Exceptions
In addition to the foregoing exceptions, there is the possibility that Congress
could exercise its legislative authority to minimize patent barriers to the creation of
vaccines for biodefense. The Constitutional basis for the patent system grants
Congress the right to decide what, if any, patent system shall exist. Congress may
at any time limit or even eliminate patents pursuant to this authority. As discussed
earlier, because the United States is subject to international agreements that now
mandate the existence of a patent system with some minimum requirements,
regardless of Constitutional authority, Congress should not reduce patent
protection below these levels without subjecting the United States to possible
noncompliance with TRIPS.
As TRIPS is now the minimum level below which patent protection
cannot fall, a re-cap of TRIPS requirements is pertinent to examining what possible
adjustments to patent protection could be made in the interest of reducing patent
barriers to the development of biodefense vaccines. As discussed earlier, there are
two possible ways that patent rights can be modified under TRIPS - either by

220. For cases in which a court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, see Hybritech, Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 4 USPQ2d 1001, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 1987), affd, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Scripps
Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1987), on motion for
reconsideration, 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988),further opinion, 707 F.Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal.
1989), 724 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1989), affd in part,rev"d in part, vacated in part & remanded,927
F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991); American Cyanamid Co. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 833 F. Supp. 92, 134 (D.
Conn. 1992) (the accused infringer's product, an absorbable suture, "has spurred interest from
numerous hospitals and doctors, who see it potentially as an innovative product with advantages over
the previously existing products").
221. The CellPro case is one example. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184, 189 (D.
Del. 1997); see also supra note 192 and accompanying text; Schneider (Europe) AG v. SciMed Life
Systems, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 813, 850-51, 861-62 (D. Minn. 1994), affd, 60 F.3d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 990 (1995) (granting permanent injunction with a one-year transition "to allow an
efficient and non-disruptive changeover for those institutions and physicians who now employ the
[infringer's product] exclusively"); Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1500,
1517 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (noting that to suddenly withdraw the infringing devices with which a large
number of surgeons are "unquestionably" familiar and have been trained to use "could have a serious
disruptive effect on surgical practice"); Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Labs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 964, 971 (C.D.
Cal. 1985), affid, 794 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (granting an injunction against defendant's sale of an
infringing blood oxygenator, but delaying the injunction for six months to minimize negative impacts
on hospitals and surgery candidates).
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reducing the scope of patentable subject matter or by creating exceptions to patent
rights. Each will be discussed in turn.
a. Limits to PatentableSubject Matter
While theoretically possible, proposed limits to patentable subject matter
are likely to face serious opposition in Congress. The United States Supreme
Court has taken an expansive view of patentable subject matter and repeatedly
stated that Congress can limit the laws if it sees fit. 222 However, proposals to limit
patentable subject matter have thus far not been politically viable. In particular,
although there have been proposals to deny patentability to controversial subject
matter ranging from transgenic animals to products of human cloning, so far, no
such legislation has been passed.223 There have also been indirect attempts to limit
For example, a recently-passed
the scope of patentable subject matter.
to
appropriations bill proposes to disallow the PTO from using government funds 224
issue patents on inventions that are "directed to . . . a human organism.
Although TRIPS clearly permits some exclusions from patentability, in light of the
unlikely passage of such subject matter exclusions due to existing judicial
precedent and political limitations, a TRIPS analysis seems unnecessary.225
b. Limits to PatentRights/Exceptions to PatentInfringement
Based on past history, it may be easier for Congress to enact exceptions to
patent rights than to create new exclusions for patentable subject matter. For

222. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc., v. Pioneer HiBred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
223. E.g., S.2600, 107th Cong. (2002); see also infra note 226 and accompanying text (concerning
enacted law to limit remedies for infringement of patented medical procedures, rather than proposed
legislation to eliminate such technology from the scope of patentable subject matter). Similarly,
Congress has declined to enact legislation to impose moratoriums on patentability of controversial
subject matter. See, e.g., S. 387, 103rd Cong., § 3 (1993) (proposing two-year moratorium on the
patenting of animals); S.2169, 101st Cong., § 2 (1990) (proposing five-year moratorium on patenting
of genetically modified animals).
224. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118 Stat. 3, 100
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 12, U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 49
U.S.C) (prohibiting the PTO from using government funds to "issue patents on claims directed to or
encompassing a human organism"). However, because it is in an appropriations bill, it will
automatically expire after the fiscal year, unless renewed. In addition, it is notable that the Weldon
amendment was passed after a more direct attempt to amend the Patent Act had failed. In particular,
Senator Brownback had previously proposed an amendment to a Terrorism Bill (providing for federal
funding to insurance companies) that included an amendment to narrow the scope of patentable subject
matter. S.2600, 107th Cong. (2002). Although Brownback's original amendment was blocked, when
itwas re-drafted as the Weldon amendment to limit funding of the PTO for issuance of similar patents,
it was passed.
225. To the extent that exclusions from patentability appear to be a viable option, the same
principles discussed earlier concerning TRIPS parameters for subject matter are pertinent. See supra
notes 55-106 and accompanying text.
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example, Congress enacted legislation to allow generic drug manufacturers the
ability to use patented inventions during the patent term for the purposes of
obtaining FDA approval that would speed the sale of such generics after the patent
expires.226 Congress also enacted legislation that immunizes medical doctors from
infringement when using certain patented medical procedures.227 Interestingly, the
exception for medical doctors was enacted instead of proposals to exclude the
subject matter from patentability, suggesting that limitations to patent rights may
be politically more palatable.228 Moreover, although this exception was somewhat
controversial when enacted, there have since been some proposals that essentially
build upon this framework with the intent of expanding the exception to include
medical tests.229
Although it may be more palatable to enact statutory exceptions to patent
rights, compliance with TRIPS remains an important issue. As discussed in the
context of the Canada-Generics decision, the interpretation of a limited permissible
exception is quite narrow. In addition, although there are presently some United
States laws that permit infringement broadly, it is not clear that these would
withstand a challenge under the WTO framework. To avoid problems under
TRIPS, proposed legislation should probably closely mirror either the procedural
provisions of Article 31 or be very narrowly tailored to adequately satisfy the
three-part test of Article 30.

226. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e). Not only was this legislation crafted for public policy reasons, but it was
prompted by a Federal Circuit case, Roche v. Bolar, that had held that use of a patented invention by
generic companies to obtain FDA approval constituted patent infringement. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.
1984). The legislative response is not surprisingly called the "Bolar exception." For further discussion
of the history behind this provision, as well as the larger Hatch-Waxman Act of which it is a part, see
Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived their
Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389 (1999).
227. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). The precise parameters of this provision are complex and somewhat
unclear since there do not seem to be any cases where this provision has been relied upon as a defense
in litigation. Nonetheless, for additional information concerning the perceived scope of this provision,
as well as potential international problems, see Cynthia M. Ho, Patents,Patients, and Public Policy: An
Incomplete Intersection at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601 (2000).
228. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (providing medical doctors immunity from patent infringement)
with H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing to exclude medical procedures from patentability). In
addition, the exemption for medical procedures was included as part of a general appropriations bill,
such that some have suggested that the substance of the bill was never actually considered. See, e.g.,
142 CONG. REC. S 11,843 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 142 CONG. REC. H8277
(daily ed. July 24, 1996) (statement of Rep. Moorehead); id. at H8279 (daily ed. July 24, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Schroder); id. at H8278 (statement of Rep. Mollohan).
229. H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002) (proposing to amend the Patent Act to exempt medical
practitioners utilizing genetic diagnostic tests from patent infringement remedies); H.R. 3966, 107th
Cong. (2002) (conducting study of the impact of federal policies on the innovation process for genomic
technologies).
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CONCLUSION
As the anthrax scare aptly illustrated, patents can quickly become a
compelling issue when they impact effective inoculation against a national terrorist
threat. This article provides an important analysis of potential patent pitfalls that
must be navigated for successful development of biodefense vaccines.
In
particular, specific research and development activities of vaccine creation that
could raise patent infringement problems have been outlined. This article details
potential avenues of avoiding or minimizing patent liability under the present
United States patent laws. The potential vulnerability of these laws to either
domestic or international challenges have been included as well for a
comprehensive approach to the situation. In addition, the extensive TRIPS
analysis should also be of practical assistance in the event of Congressional
consideration of further legislation to promote vaccine development. The analysis
of TRIPS provided in this article can be utilized to help craft legislation that will
withstand scrutiny under TRIPS and the WTO.230
In addition to the importance of this article to the development of biodefense
vaccines, the analytical framework should also have continued value beyond the
present issue in the current climate that is infused with fear of terrorism.
Regardless of the prevailing public health crisis that may be at issue, the same
exceptions to patent liability as well as corresponding TRIPS compliance issues
will continue to exist. Accordingly, the analysis outlined here should have
enduring value for issues yet to arise at the intersection of patents and public
health.

230. Indeed, in the wake of the anthrax scare, there was a Congressional proposal regarding
compulsory licensing of patents. H.R. 3235, 107th Cong. (2001) (providing for compulsory licensing
for certain patented inventions relating to health); H.R. 1708, 107th Cong. (2001) (same); H.R. 2927,
106th Cong. (1999) (same).

